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The history of interpretation of the phrase nous Christou, which Paul employs in 1 Cor 
2:16, mainly focuses on tracing the Hellenistic influence on his writings. No doubt, the Greek 
language Paul employs in explaining the gospel and the dominant culture of his world make 
this scholarly proclivity a credible one. But Paul, being a faithful Jew and a creative writer, is 
capable of appealing to his rich and diverse religious heritage, and his literary ingenuity to 
communicate his message. This angle of interpretation is seldom explored in discussing the 
nous Christou. In this thesis, I will make three modest claims: first, I will argue that the nous 
Christou is a product of Paul’s ingenious use of multiple religious and philosophical traditions 
to expound the good news, and to address the pressing issues at Corinth. This means that the 
nous Christou is not merely an importation from Hellenistic philosophy, but is a conflation of 
several traditions: the LXX, Greek philosophy, and Paul’s literary ingenuity. Emma 
Wasserman aptly captures this reading: “Paul … [is] a producer of a highly creative synthesis 
of multiple traditions.”1 I will also suggest that Paul’s idea of nous is congruous with the 
various nuances found in the LXX. But the special impetus he gives the concept (i.e., Spirit-
inspired mindset) is analogous to the animating role of nous in philosophy. “The Spirit” and 
Greek philosophy’s “nous,” however, are not interchangeable. But in the context of 1 Cor 2:16, 
Paul imbues the nous Christou with the Spirit making its role comparable to the nous in secular 
Greek literature—that is, to the Demiurge. Another obvious ground for comparison is the 
ontological nature of the nous Christou in the ekklēsia and the Spirit’s role in “perfecting” the 
assembly in the image of Christ. Both are well-known themes in Middle Platonism and 
Neoplatonism. 
                                                        
1 Emma Wasserman, “Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide? The Case of 
Pauline Anthropology in Romans 7 and 2 Corinthians 4—5,” in Stanley E. Porter and 
Andrew W. Pitts (eds.), Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism: Social and Literary 
Contexts for the New Testament (Leiden: Boston, 2013), 278. 
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Second, I will define the controverted nous Christou as a Spirit-inspired, Christ-like 
mindset that ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body, and makes Christ 
concretely present in the assembly. This mouthful definition contains five indispensable 
elements: Spirit-inspired, Christ-like mindset, ontological, ekklēsia, and concrete presence. 
“Spirit-inspired” implies that the nous Christou is not simply a “mindset” that the ekklēsia 
imbibes from listening to the gospel. Rather, the nous Christou is a “mindset” that is instilled 
into the ekklēsia by the Spirit in order to empower the assembly to comprehend the mysteries 
of God. “Mindset” suggests that the nous Christou is not simply interchangeable with the Spirit, 
but is a peculiar way of living that emanates from a characteristic ontological feature. Most 
important, it is an ethically informed decision-making process that springs from the ekklēsia’s 
ontological character. The inclusion of mindset is a judgment on Paul’s influence: the LXX. 
“Ontological” alludes to Paul’s Hellenistic world. The nous Christou is not just a way of 
thinking, but is an intrinsic feature that marks the ekklēsia as a part of Christ. Ekklēsia houses 
the nous Christou. It also emphasizes the communal character of the nous Christou. Paul is 
primarily addressing the ekklēsia. The individuals, because they are a part of the ekklēsia, 
participate in this Spirit-inspired mindset. Christ’s concrete presence highlights the main 
objective of the nous Christou. This purpose is critical to the third part of my thesis: nous 
Christou (though occurring once) underlies all of Paul’s responses to the ekklēsia in Corinth. 
My insight into Christ’s concrete presence is based on Paul’s directive in 1 Cor 5:3. Here, Paul 
invites the ekklēsia to summon his spirit (since he was absent) to its gathering. He argues that 
when his spirit is among them, they will be able to act in accordance with his will. By extension, 
the Spirit makes Christ concretely present in the ekklēsia. My third assertion is that nous 
Christou foregrounds all the responses of Paul to the issues besieging the church at Corinth. 
My argument is anchored in a profound and thorough understanding of nous Christou as a 
Spirit-inspired mindset that ontologically marks the ekklēsia as a part of Christ. Hence, albeit 
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nous Christou occurs only once in First Corinthians, I will argue that Paul’s formulaic 
delineation of the ekklēsia in Corinth as “God’s field and building,” “the Spirit’s temple,” and 
the “Christ’s body” are valid angles to the multifaceted reality of having the nous Christou. 
My claim will also be founded on the solution that Paul proffers for each of the problems: the 
recognition of the ekklēsia as Christ’s body. Thus, even in passages where the assembly is not 
called Christ’s body outright, I will argue that this mindset governs Paul’s exhortations and 
condemnations. My fundamental presupposition in these claims is that Paul’s conviction about 
Christ, the Spirit, and the ekklēsia is consistent, and it cuts across the entire letter. Next, I will 
explain the tasks outlined for each chapter. 
In chapter one, I will investigate the use of nous in the socio-religious milieu of Paul: 
the LXX, Middle Platonism, Philo, Josephus, and Neoplatonism. I will study the evolution of 
the concept, its nuances, and its application in the different philosophical traditions. The aim 
here is to ascertain the traditions that underlie Paul’s nous Christou. Although the LXX will be 
the primary text for my study of Paul’s religious influence, I will compare its instances of nous 
with the MT’s lev. When there is an irreconcilable variation in texts, my preferred reading will 
be the LXX for these reasons: it features nous (the term being investigated), it is the version of 
Scripture that Paul presumably used, and it is supposedly based on an older Hebrew manuscript 
that is non-extant. Since nous frequently translates the Hebrew lev, I will offer some reasons 
for the LXX translators’ choice of nous for lev instead of the proper Greek word for heart, 
kardia. Without doing an in-depth study of the Hebrew lev (which would be another thesis), I 
will describe the noticeable pattern in my assessment of all the instances of nous in the LXX. 
In studying the occurrences of nous in the Hebrew Scriptures, I will divide the LXX into two 
parts: the proto-canonical and the deuterocanonical books. My decision to analyze the instances 
of nous in the LXX in this way is not based on the subsequent appropriation of the 
deuterocanonical books (which is not the concern of this thesis). Rather, it is founded on the 
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peculiar Greek origin of these books. As such, the authors who employed this concept were 
not simply translating lev into Greek, but were using the term with a unique Hellenistic sense. 
My study of the LXX’s usage will be attentive to this possibility without dismissing the 
likelihood of an identical usage between both books: proto-canonical and deuterocanonical. 
In presenting the Middle Platonists’ view of nous, I will particularly expose the views 
of four adherents of this school of thought: Antiochus, Posidonius, Plutarch, and Albinus. My 
exposé of these Middle Platonists’ idea of nous is not designed to be an exhaustive treatise on 
this philosophical trend, but is intended to be representative of this philosophy. As such, it 
suffices to make a judgment on Paul’s probable influence, if need be. Philo, though a staunch 
advocate of this philosophy, will be treated separately, because of his special Jewish heritage: 
he has a common ground with Paul. In discussing Philo’s use of nous, I will explore his unique 
hermeneutical adaptation of Greek philosophy in explicating the Hebrew Scriptures. His 
philosophical reading of the Torah will be invaluable in establishing Paul’s underlying 
philosophy of the nous Christou. After Philo, I will examine Josephus’s use of nous, which is 
also highly significant, because of his Jewish heritage—a common ground with Paul. Being a 
historian, Josephus offers an alternative way of using nous that is purely secular. This study 
will attempt to situate Paul’s nous Christou in the Jewish philosophical tradition, or in the 
Jewish secular-cum-religious tradition. After Josephus, I will examine the concept of nous in 
Neoplatonism. Albeit this philosophical tradition attains its apogee two centuries after Paul, I 
will treat its use of nous, because its foundation might be traceable to the first century. Besides, 
a broad stroke on the philosophical traditions that would have influenced Paul demands a study 
of all notable philosophies in the world of his time (before and after his era). In discussing 
Neoplatonism, individual adherents will not be given any attention. Rather, the focus will be 
on the philosophy’s understanding and explanation of the role of the nous in the creation of the 
world and its connection to the One. In chapter two, I will investigate the concept of nous in 
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the undisputed letters, the disputed letters, and its appearance in Luke and Revelation. The 
different nuances Paul gives the term in the undisputed letters will be critically evaluated, and 
its correlation to the disputed letters and to Luke and Revelation will be thoroughly defined. 
Here, I will offer a provisional definition for the nous Christou in the light of Paul’s creative 
and ingenious use of multiple traditions. This definition indicates my understanding of the nous 
Christou, the role it plays in the ekklēsia of First Corinthians, and the traditions that influenced 
Paul. So nous Christou, if rightly understood, is not a once-off terminology. Rather, it 
foregrounds each Pauline claim regarding the ekklēsia, especially his responses to the abuses 
reported to him. But my claim in this thesis will be a modest one: nous Christou underlies all 
of Paul’s responses to the issues facing the church at Corinth. 
In chapter three, I will indicate the ethical relevance of the nous Christou. I will also x-
ray the structure of Paul’s responses, paying close attention to three main components: 
complaints, metaphors, and solutions offered. In discussing these key parts of Paul’s replies, I 
will argue that his description of the problem bespeaks the absence of the nous Christou; his 
metaphor for the ekklēsia describes the possession of the nous Christou; and his solution to 
these issues reveals an act of genuine witness by an ekklēsia that has the nous Christou. Mindful 
that First Corinthians is not a Pauline treatise on the nous Christou, I will say that this 
connection is often implied or suggested. But if my description of the nous Christou is adhered 
to, this conclusion becomes logical and inevitable. Albeit this work focuses on First 
Corinthians, its conclusion can easily be extended to Paul’s other letters, because his conviction 
about Christ, the Spirit, and the ekklēsia remains the same throughout his letters. These three 
elements are integral pillars of Paul’s evangelization. 
From the standpoint of methodology, this thesis will feature four chapters with the 
following captions: “Nous in Paul’s Socio-Religious Milieu” (chapter one), “Nous in Paul’s 
Letters and in the NT” (chapter two), “Nous Christou as the Source of Communal 
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Transformation” (chapter three), and the conclusion (chapter four). The default biblical text for 
all English citations will be the NRSV. The English citations from the LXX will be based on 
the landmark translation of Lancelot C. L. Brenton, who based his work on the Vaticanus, a 
fourth-century manuscript of the LXX. In places where the Greek text appeared mutilated and 
corrupted, he augmented it with Alexandrinus, a fifth-century manuscript. The NRSV is 
retained for the English translations of the MT. Besides this, any other biblical text used will 




















NOUS IN PAUL’S SOCIO-RELIGIOUS MILIEU 
Most studies on Paul’s use of nous focus on his immediate Hellenistic environment: 
Greek philosophy and literature, and the Pauline letters themselves. As such, these scholarly 
efforts are geared toward tracing the influence of Neoplatonism on Paul or his noticeable 
divergence from such philosophical trends. In this chapter, however, we will adopt a broader 
perspective to Paul’s context by studying his socio-religious milieu: the Septuagint (LXX), 
Middle Platonism, Philo’s works, Josephus’s writings, and Neoplatonism.2 This study will 
explore the different traditions featuring nous; it will also identify the usage that is analogous 
to Paul’s and those unrelated to it. The LXX’s use of nous will be the pith of this chapter, since 
Paul appealed to it copiously in his letters. The LXX will be treated in two parts: the proto-
canonical books and the deuterocanonical books. The decision to treat the deuterocanonical 
books separately is not based on the subsequent appropriation of these books into the Bible (a 
theme that is not the immediate concern of this thesis), but on their uniquely Greek origin. 
Since their attested existence was first (and, in some cases, only) in Greek, their use of 
traditional Greek concepts, like nous, will naturally have a genuinely Hellenistic flavor. 
 A look at the occurrences of nous in the proto-canonical books clearly shows that the 
LXX consistently translates the Hebrew lev either as kardia or nous. Lev has a wide spectrum 
of meanings: (1) it refers to a physical organ; (2) it is the seat of judgment; (3) it denotes human 
reason (nous); and (4) it is the seat of conscience.3 Lev seems to be the most important organ 
                                                        
2 These traditions listed are not exhaustive, but represent the dominant trends in the 
history of nous in the Greek-speaking world. 
3 Lev as a “physical organ”: Bell claims that lev has this meaning in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. Richard Bell, “‘But We Have the Mind of Christ’: Some Theological and 
Anthropological Reflections on 1 Corinthians 2:16,” in Stanley E. Porter and Matthew R. 
Malcolm (eds.), Horizons in Hermeneutics: A Festschrift in Honor of Anthony C. Thiselton 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013); Lev as “the seat of conscience”: The classical biblical 
reference for this idea is Joel 2:12-13: “… Return to me [the Lord] with all your heart (lev), 
with fasting, with weeping, and with mourning; rend your hearts (lev) and not your 
clothing….” 
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in a human being from the standpoint of religion: it makes conversion possible. Among these 
strands of meanings, the LXX has reserved the thinking faculty, or meanings related to thought, 
for nous. The argument I want to set forth in this section is that the LXX renders lev as nous 
when at least one of these conditions is present: first, the reference is to a rational process, like 
thought, plan, or understanding; second, lev is used figuratively in the Hebrew text—when it 
does not suggest a spatial or physical concept; and third, the operative verb in the sentence 
implies some rational activity. These established categories are not meant to be strict 
pigeonholes for nous in the proto-canonical books, but are helpful groupings for each instance 
that will be analyzed below.  
The other argument I intend to set forth is that Paul’s use of nous was influenced by the 
tradition that gave birth to the LXX and Josephus’s writings; however, his implicit use of the 
Spirit that inspires and animates the nous Christou is parallel to the divine nous in Greek 
philosophy.4 Thus, as I shall argue in the next chapter, Paul’s nous Christou is a coalescing of 
the LXX’s and Josephus’s ideas of nous (the term) and that of Greek philosophy (something 
ethereal). Paul uses the LXX’s term and imbues it with a transcendental notion identical to that 
of Hellenistic philosophy. This explains why scholars disagree on how to interpret Paul’s nous 
Christou. Since the nous Christou will be discussed in the ensuing chapter, I will focus on 
setting forth these traditions clearly in this chapter. The sequence for studying nous in the LXX 
will be: the historical books, the prophetic writings, and the wisdom literature. 
 
 
Nous in the Proto-canonical Books 
                                                        
4 My argument is not that the nous in Greek philosophy is interchangeable with the 
Spirit in Paul, but rather that the similarity between both concepts will shed light on one’s 
grasp of the nous Christou. I am also not making nor do I intend to make a claim in favor of 
Paul’s conscious use of Greek philosophy. All I am saying is that nous in Greek philosophy 
(in the context of nous Christou) functions like the Spirit in Paul.  
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The first use of nous in the LXX occurs in the plague narrative in Exod 7:23. The text 
reads: “Pharaoh turned and went into his house, and he did not take even this to heart (nous).” 
The things Pharaoh refused to think about were the things Moses and Aaron told him. 
Pharaoh’s heart (kardia) remained hardened and he did not think (nous) about the incident. 
Beginning with this text is important for two reasons: first, the Hebrew text uses lev throughout; 
second, whenever the Hebrew verb hazaq (to harden) is used for the heart, the LXX translates 
it as kardia; but whenever sît (to set) is used with lev, the latter is rendered as nous. For the 
LXX translators, the meaning of lev in each passage can only be determined when it is taken 
alongside the operative verb. Hence, the “hardening” of the heart (which connotes a physical 
organ) refers to the Greek kardia, while the “setting” of the heart on something (figurative 
expression) denotes nous. Although in modern English the “hardening” of and the “setting” of 
the heart on something are both figurative expressions, in the Hebrew world of 250 BCE, it 
was not. Hardening refers to a physical organ of decision-making, while setting one’s heart on 
something is a metaphorical use of that same physical organ for some rational activity. This 
distinction is implied in the choice of a different Greek word for lev whenever the verb suggests 
thought. This use of nous meets all three aforementioned criteria: thought, figurative usage, 
and operative verb. It is also a singular example, because it features the nuances in the Hebrew 
understanding of the human heart. 
In Josh 14:7, Joshua recounts his espionage in the land of Kadesh-Barnea, which was 
sanctioned by Moses. The text reads: “I was forty years old when Moses the servant of the 
Lord sent me from Kadesh-barnea to spy out the land; and I brought him an honest report.” 
This biblical text has two variants: is it according to “his mind” (LXX) or “my mind” (MT)? I 
am inclined to the LXX’s reading (for reasons earlier stated), because it is in accordance with 
good reporting: communicating to the satisfaction of the sender. This is effective reporting. 
Thus, for Joshua to report to Moses, according to the latter’s mind, means speaking to him 
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honestly about the espionage. Joshua is not expected to tell Moses what he thinks (“my mind”), 
but to report “honestly” what he had seen, in accordance to Moses’ expectation (“his mind”). 
The NRSV’s translation here is excellent: “I brought him an honest report.” This translation is 
important, because it emphasizes the objectivity of Joshua’s report, unlike that of the other 
spies that instilled fear in the hearts of the people: “But my companions who went up with me 
made the heart (kardia) of the people melt (Josh 14:8).5  
Because of the divergent connotations of lev in both contexts, the LXX translates the 
first as nous and the second as kardia. In the first, the reference was to “faithful, honest, or 
objective” reporting; while, in the second, lev bespeaks a physical organ. The NRSV says that 
the report of “the brothers” made the people’s hearts melt. While this is a good translation, the 
verb in question is hamas (to cause violence). Hence, a better reading would be that the people 
were frightened by “the brothers’” report, unlike that of Joshua which seemingly was honest 
and encouraging, since it gave them a chance to capture the land. Looking at our three 
categories once again, this use of nous fulfills two of them: thinking process and figurative use 
of the heart. 
Moving on to the prophetic writings, it is noteworthy to state that all occurrences of 
nous in prophetic literature are found in Isaiah. In Isa 10:7, lev is used twice in the Hebrew 
text: the first is translated as psychē, while the second is rendered as nous. Neither of the two 
instances of lev connotes a physical organ, because the first is governed by verbs of thinking, 
damah (to consider) and hasav (to think), while the second is synonymous with a plan or 
purpose. The text reads: “But this is not what he intends, nor does he have this in mind (lev); 
but it is in his heart (lev) to destroy, and to cut off nations not a few.” Both could have been 
rendered as nous, but the translators chose to assign psychē to the first, and nous to the second. 
                                                        
5 Kardia is once again depicted as having physical qualities. In this context, it is 
likened to wax. 
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This idea of nous coheres with the earlier noted categories: it is synonymous with plan or 
purpose; the operative verb suggests a thinking process; and lev is used figuratively. The later 
part of this verse presents textual variations: the LXX says, “but his mind (nous) shall change, 
and that to destroy not a few nations,” while the MT says, “his purpose is to destroy; to put an 
end to not a few nations.” The LXX considers lev to be alterable—it alludes to a thought 
process. Hence, it regards lev as God’s “mindset” or “intention.” Once again, the LXX chooses 
nous, because lev denotes a thought process. 
Nous appears again in Isa 10:12: “…He [God] will punish the arrogant boasting of the 
king of Assyria and his haughty pride.” The LXX translates the Hebrew phrase godel levav 
(“pride of heart”) as ton noun ton megan (“arrogant mind”). Looking at the Hebrew parallel of 
“heart” and “eyes,” one would think that the reference here is to a physical organ. However, 
other intervening aspects in the sentence favor the LXX’s decision: “fruit of a proud heart” and 
“glory of haughty eyes.” The parallel here is a figurative expression for repugnant arrogance. 
This poetic use of words is a characteristic feature of First Isaiah. The LXX translators, 
recognizing Isaiah’s poetic device, preferred nous, since the text referred to the heart 
metaphorically. Isaiah 40:13 is the famous passage Paul cites just before his emphatic 
conclusion: “But we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor 2:16). The use of nous here is quite 
unusual, because the Hebrew noun is ruah (breath or spirit); and, up until now, ruah has not 
been rendered as nous. Thus our bewilderment: Why did the LXX not translate ruah as 
pneuma—the obvious Greek equivalent? There are three clues in this verse, which indicate that 
ruah is not a physical entity in this context, but a metaphorical one. The clues are the phrases: 
“who understood,” “his counsel,” and “who instructed him.” These phrases suggest an ongoing 
rational activity. The verbs “to understand” and “to instruct” normally depict teaching and 
learning, and are classic rational activities, while the noun “counsel” denotes a plan, or thought 
process. If combined, the sentence speaks about the surpassing wisdom of God’s plan, purpose, 
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or design. I will now examine some instances of ruah in Second Isaiah, where the LXX renders 
it as pneuma.  
The LXX uses pneuma in Isa 42:1. Here pneuma is used as a divine principle that 
enables God’s servant to bring justice to the nations. It denotes not just God’s thought (nous), 
but the principle of God’s intervention in the history of the chosen people. Isaiah 42:5 uses 
pneuma in a similar fashion. It communicates a parallel idea as “breath.” The last part of the 
verse speaks of “breath to the people” and “spirit to those who walk in it.” These phrases refer 
to the same thing: the principle through which God sustains humans. It is interesting to note 
the following characteristics of the LXX’s use of pneuma: (1) it originates from God; and (2) 
it is imparted upon humans to fulfill God’s design. These features are reechoed in Isa 44:3: “I 
will pour out my spirit on your offspring.” Given the LXX’s nuanced and consistent use of 
pneuma, Isa 40:13 falls short of these noticeable characteristics and is thus rendered as nous, 
since its focus is on God’s plan or thought process. Let us now return to nous.  
The MT of Isa 41:22 employs the cohortative with lev. The text reads: “Let us place 
our heart.” The LXX takes this statement as a metaphor and thus has rendered it as “we will 
make the mind alert.” In line with this figurative sense, most translations say: “That we may 
consider them.” The operative verb here is also suggestive of a metaphor: “to place” in the 
heart. From what we have already seen, lev is translated as nous whenever the reference is to a 
thought process, a figurative use of the heart, or the operative verb suggests this. I shall now 
examine the use of nous in the wisdom literature.  
Proverbs 29:7 has some textual variants. The MT reads: “The righteous knows how to 
give judgment to the poor; the wicked has no knowledge of this [judgment in favor of the 
poor].” The LXX significantly differs: “The righteous knows how to judge [in favor of] the 
poor, but the impious does not understand this, and the poor does not have this discerning mind 
(nous).” The last phrase of the LXX gives us more information about the poor person: he does 
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not realize that the wicked is not interested in his welfare. Nous here evokes a mental process: 
the poor is not able “to discern” (to assess the situation critically) the intention of the wicked. 
This use of nous concurs with the established pattern. Proverbs 31:3 presents another textual 
variation. The MT reads: “Do not give your strength (or wealth) to women, and your ways to 
(those) who blot out kings.” The second part of this verse in the LXX is slightly different: “and 
(do not give) your mind and life to regret.” Textual issues aside, the Greek term translated as 
“regret” (hysteroboulia) has the idea of a “deliberation” after an event has occurred. To 
deliberate is to think, so the LXX has chosen the apt word to express this: nous. 
Job 7:17 reinforces the figurative use of nous. The MT and LXX agree on this verse. 
The MT states: “That you place your heart toward him,” while the LXX reads: “That you give 
thought to him.” Either way, nous implies thought. Job 7:20 presents a minor textual variation: 
whereas the MT says “watcher of humans,” the LXX reads, “the one who discovers the mind 
(nous) of humans.” Interestingly, the MT does not use the word lev; but the LXX supplies nous 
because the context connotes thought. Discovering the “mind” of humans is equivalent to 
knowing their “thoughts.” This implies a mental activity: how humans think. Again, this use 
corroborates the three criteria above. Job 33:16 underscores the metaphorical idea of nous. The 
MT reads: “At that time, he (God) will open the ear of humanity,” while the LXX has: “Then, 
he opens the mind of humans.” The LXX perceived “ear” to be a metaphor for the human 
capacity to listen. Thus it rendered the expression as the “mind of humanity.” The Tanakh also 
translates this as opening “men’s understanding.” Nous indicates a thinking process: 
understanding. Nous in Job 36:19 has no corollary in the MT. The beginning of the verse in the 
LXX reads: “Lest your willing mind of prayer deviate in distress,” while the MT has “will your 
wealth keep you from distress?” In the LXX’s wording, nous means “mindset” of prayer. 
Hence, a figurative sense is intended here. This use of nous is slightly nuanced and differs from 
our proposal. But a case can be made for “thought” or “understanding” evolving into a 
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“mindset.” In summary, nous refers to a figurative use of the heart; it delineates a mental 
(thought) process, and is often used with verbs that imply thinking. I shall now look at the 
deuterocanonical books. 
 
Nous in the Deuterocanonical Books 
The deuterocanonical books contain a consistent idea of the nous: mind or a rational 
activity. Due to the Greek repertoire of speculative vocabulary, nous in these writings seldom 
has a figurative sense—metaphor for the human heart. For instance, when Ezra read aloud the 
law to the hearing of the multitude present, the last part of the sentence reads: “And all the 
multitude gave [their] mind (nous) to the law” (1 Esd 9:41). Nous here means thought. The 
RSV reads: “All the multitude paid attention to the law.” The RSV stresses the concentration 
of the throng using: “gave their mind to.” In Jdt 8:14, nous denotes God’s thought. It reads: 
“… and know his (God’s) mind and comprehend his reasoning.” Nous in this verse describes 
God’s thought or “reasoning.” This notion of nous totally agrees with the others.  
Wisdom 4:12 continues this idea of nous. It reads: “For the fascination of wickedness 
obscures what is good, and roving desire perverts the innocent mind (nous).” Nous here is 
synonymous with mindset. The “innocent mind” refers to a naïve person’s disposition toward 
the lures of wickedness. Wisdom 9:15 reiterates this: “For the perishable body weighs down 
the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind (nous).” Nous here is a mental 
activity. In the Susanna story, Daniel levels three accusations against the two wicked elders: 
(1) perversion of minds; (2) refusal think divinely; and (3) unwillingness to recall righteous 
judgments (Sus 1:9). Nous in this verse retains the idea of a mindset: a way of thinking. This 
usage agrees with the others. I shall now look at nous in the books of Maccabees that feature 
about half of the word’s occurrences in the deuterocanonical books. 
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In 2 Macc 15:8, Judas Maccabeus urged his militia not to fear the attack of the Gentiles, 
“but to keep in mind (nous) the former times when help came from the heavens.” The function 
of nous here is recalling: mental activity.6 Third Maccabees 1:25 speaks of the elders closest 
to the king “trying to change his arrogant mind (nous) from the plot he had conceived.” This 
instance of nous addresses the king’s arrogant way of thinking (mindset). Nous is used with 
epiboule (plot) and enthumeomai (to consider). Here nous means thought.  
Fourth Maccabees 2:22 features nous with a distinctly philosophical undertone. It 
speaks of “the enthronement of the mind (nous) over the senses, as a sacred governor over them 
all.” This nous does not simply mean thought, but is given a philosophical task over the bodily 
senses. The ensuing verse buttresses this reading when it says: “To this (the mind) he gave the 
law; and one who lives subject to this will rule a kingdom that is temperate, just, good, and 
courageous.” This argumentation is reminiscent of the great Greek philosophers—Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle. It is also characteristic of Plotinus and Philo. Fourth Maccabees 5:11 
carries on this philosophical flavor of nous. Although nous in this verse is parallel to mindset, 
it has a philosophical nuance. Nous also denotes the discernment the truth. Truth is used in a 
sublime sense, somewhat different from the basic, traditional Hebrew idea of constancy. In 4 
Macc 16:13, the mother of the seven sons who were put to death was described as “having an 
adamant mind (nous),” which can be paraphrased as a resilient disposition toward adversity. 
While nous was parallel to mindset or disposition, the philosophical atmosphere of this book 
is remarkably different from that of the proto-canonical books. There is philosophizing about 
immortality, death, human passions, and the primacy and preeminence of nous over other 
senses—all concepts that were the preoccupation of the Greek thinkers. 
 In the deuterocanonical books, nous is consistently used to depict one’s disposition, 
mindset, or worldview. Nous describes a person’s way of thinking that was subject to a moral 
                                                        
6 Lev is used figuratively in this sentence.  
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judgment, either positive or negative. In some contexts, nous delineates the actual mind itself 
and other rational processes. In 4 Macc, nous assumes a Greek philosophical coloration. Nous 
here is regarded as the chair of the bodily senses, a familiar theme in Hellenistic philosophy. 
These notions of nous are palpably different from those of the proto-canonical books. Nous in 
4 Macc is accorded some priority in describing a person’s disposition. Given the heightening 
philosophical undertone of nous with the progression in timeline, one might argue that the later 
biblical authors became more at home with some Hellenistic categories in expressing the nous. 
I shall now turn to Middle Platonism. 
 
Nous in Middle Platonism 
Middle Platonism refers to the Greco-Roman philosophy that spanned 80 BCE to 220 
CE. It focuses on the application of classical Greek philosophy to pertinent issues of this era. 
The renowned philosophers in this epoch include Antiochus, Posidonius, Plutarch, Albinus, 
and Philo. The latter’s view on nous will be discussed separately. Middle Platonism’s idea of 
the nous is greatly influenced by theories of cosmology, emanation, and creation. The Middle 
Platonists generally accept the existence of a Supreme Being or a transcendent One who gave 
life to the universe. They also believe that the transcendent One or Primal God created the 
world through an intermediary who makes the being of the inaccessible One manifest to the 
universe. This intermediary being is called the Demiurge. Some of these Middle Platonists 
describe the Demiurge as a World Soul, Intellect, agent or logos of the Supreme Being. Some 
even called it a second God.7 Most important, they identify the Demiurge as the nous of the 
transcendent One. The Demiurge is regarded as the transcendent One’s nous, because it is the 
principle through which the latter reveals itself to the world. The Demiurge bears the imprint 
                                                        
7 John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 BC to AD 220 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977), 7. 
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of orderliness and being of the transcendent One. These characteristics of the Supreme Being 
are imposed on creatures through the mediation of the Demiurge. The universe retains the 
imprint of the Demiurge which is the created nous, distinct from the uncreated nous in the 
Demiurge. Through the created nous, the world remains in contact with the transcendent One 
who sustains it and perfects it. Middle Platonists, however, disagree on the fine details of this 
theory. I will now present the nuances given to this theory by some adherents of this school. 
Antiochus says that the human soul has two parts: rational (nous) and irrational parts 
(the senses). The rational part is the agent, while the irrational part is the instrument. Nous 
coordinates, organizes and uses the senses as an instrument for interacting with and reaching 
out to the world. Antiochus says that nous is the source of the senses because it animates and 
directs them.8 His discussion centers on the immanent or created nous in human beings. It is 
also noteworthy to say that Antiochus adopts the Platonic division of the human soul: rational 
(nous) and irrational.9 The main difference is his emphasis on a bipartite structure instead of 
the Platonic tripartite.10 Posidonius’s view differs from that of Antiochus. Whereas the latter 
speaks of an immanent nous that orders the senses, the former argues for a transcendent nous 
comparable to the heavens. Posidonius’s claims are founded on his peculiar creation theory. 
He holds that there are two foundational principles in the universe: active (God) and passive 
(matter). The imposition of divine being on matter engenders creation, while the withdrawal of 
the same leads to disintegration. Divine being is found in every creature in the universe. Indeed, 
it is the soul of all life. Posidonius’s theory is pantheistic. Divine being is the entire universe. 
God is a “fiery and intelligent spirit” that takes up the shape of any creature desired.11 The 
universe is not distinct from God, but is a part of divine being. Stratification in the cosmos is a 
                                                        
8 Ibid., 67. 
9 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 102. 
10 Plato identifies three parts of the soul: the rational, sentient and vegetative parts of 
the soul. The last two parts are irrational. 
11 Ibid., 109. 
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stratification in divine being. By emphasizing God’s direct involvement in creation, Posidonius 
implicitly rules out the Demiurge, which most Platonists subscribe to. Nous is thus a tangible 
reality in Posidonius’s scheme. But he acknowledges the sublimity of the nous by giving it the 
highest place in divine being: the heavens. In Posidonius’s design, nous is superfluous in 
showing the transcendent One’s connection to humans, because God’s being is in everything. 
Albeit Posidonius’s nous differs from that of other Middle Platonists, he retains the idea of the 
transcendent One’s indwelling in the universe. 
Plutarch partly subscribes to the Platonic tripartite structure of the human body: nous, 
soul, and body. But in his description of the human body, he posits a bipartite pairing: nous 
and soul (rational part), and soul and body (irrational part). The first pair is responsible for 
moral decisions and is thus the domain of virtue and vice; the second pair is the sensory domain 
and thus features the experience of pleasure and pain.12 Nous is the quality that makes people 
morally accountable. For Plutarch, the soul is permeated with the nous; but it is not always 
rational since some of its parts are immersed into the body. The soul is a continuum whose 
rationality is dependent on the involvement of its segments: if they are submerged in bodily 
affairs they are irrational; if they are concerned about transcendent things they are moral. 
Plutarch makes little or no effort to give the nous an ethereal existence, or to link it to the divine 
nous.  
Albinus resuscitates the Aristotelian idea of the Unmoved Mover. He argues that there 
are two types of nous: the unmoved nous and the nous in action. The “Primal God,” as he calls 
the divine being, is pure nous. The divine being is not in potentiality to anything but causes all 
things. The human nous is set into motion by the divine being who is nous par excellence.13 
Albinus’s explanation dismisses the mediatory role of the Demiurge. His theory implies God’s 
                                                        
12 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 212. 
13 Ibid., 283. 
 20 
direct role in the creation of the universe. It also means that the universe is created by unalloyed 
nous (God). For Albinus, God sets the universe in motion by ordering two Demiurges: the 
heavenly Mind and the Soul of the World. The former orders the celestial bodies (heavens), 
while the latter establishes the rest of the world (natural realm). Creation, as Dillion notes, is 
the process of being filled with divine being. It is also the turning of all creatures to God.14 
Albinus thus implies that all creatures partake of the divine nous through the reception of divine 
being and the never-ceasing retrospection of God. From this concise assessment of Middle 
Platonism, the following can be deduced: first, nous originates from God; second, nous is a 
divine substance that binds the creator to the universe; third, nous represents that which is most 
noble in the human beings; fourth, through nous the creator dwells in the universe; and lastly, 
both direct and indirect creation theories have a common denominator: through nous God 
orders the universe in accordance with the divine plan. 
 
Nous in the Works of Philo 
Philo’s idea of the nous is reminiscent of that of the Greek philosophers, especially 
Platonism. He claims that the nous is the highest part of the human soul. The three parts of the 
soul, for Philo, as well as the Greek philosophers, are the seat of reason (head), the seat of 
courage (chest), and the seat of appetite (the guts).15 He argues that in a healthy body, the 
rational part orders the activities of the irrational parts: the seat of courage and the seat of 
appetite. Conversely, if the human soul is at war within itself, reason is subjected to the dictates 
of the passions or irrational parts.16 The relationship between the rational part of the soul and 
the irrational part can be likened to that of a king and his guards. When things are rightly 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 283-284. 
15 Philo, “Allegorical Interpretation,” III, in The Works of Philo: Complete and 
Unabridged, trans. by C. D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 115. 
16 Philo, “Allegorical Interpretation,” III, 117. 
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ordered, the guards receive orders from the king; but if the guards are involved in mutiny, royal 
order disintegrates, and the king might even be prisoned by his guards. This analogy, Philo 
claims, holds true for the human soul. Being virtuous, like the chain of command in the 
military, consists in the irrational parts of the soul submitting to the dictates of the rational part, 
while being vicious delineates a situation where the appetitive parts call the shots. At the heart 
of the rational part is the nous (the mind). Nous distinguishes humans from lower animals, 
which are dominated by their irrational parts. 
Although some of the Greek philosophers locate the mind in the human head, Philo 
claims that the mind resides wherever it is needed. Since it is responsible for right judgment in 
the appetitive parts, it can be found in those parts where right judgments are taken and passions 
are controlled.17 By refusing to localize the mind, Philo implies that it is immaterial; albeit, its 
function in the human soul can be seen clearly in a virtuous or vicious act. He writes: “But it 
[the mind] is not a substance … [it] must be pronounced incorporeal.”18 He also says that the 
mind is incomprehensible, and that all attempts to determine its true nature and structure are 
futile. Elsewhere in his writings, Philo identifies the nous as the rational part of humans. There 
is no clear distinction between the rational part of humans and the mind. Philo uses both 
concepts interchangeably. So I think it is safe to assume that they mean one and the same thing 
for Philo. He also does not make any distinction between the mind and the spirit—the latter 
seems not to be his concern or relevant to his treatise.  
Besides Philo’s philosophical reading of the nous, he posits a spiritual understanding 
of it. Basing his argument on the First Creation story in Genesis, he says that the nous is 
identical with the imago Dei. Philo argues that nous is alluded to when the sacred text speaks 
of humanity being created in the image and likeness of God. He opines that the imago Dei 
                                                        
17 Philo, “Allegorical Interpretation,” III, a. 116. 
18 Philo, “On Dreams,” in The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged, trans. by 
C. D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 30. 
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makes humans distinct from other creatures, and participators in God’s role in ordering the 
universe. He writes: “But the resemblance (imago Dei) is spoken of with reference to the most 
important part of the soul, namely, the mind (nous).”19 The mind, which is the highest faculty 
in the human soul, is created in the image of God so as to connect human corporeality to the 
divine. Nous is also the imago Dei because it actively shares in God’s governance of the 
universe by its ordering of the bodily passions and senses. Regarding this, Philo states: “For 
the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind, 
which is in the universe as its primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which 
carries it about and bears its image within it.”20 This quote is obviously reminiscent of the 
emanation theory in Hellenistic philosophy. 
Further, commenting on the Second Creation account, Philo claims that the ruah God 
blew into Adam was nous.21 This breath (that is, nous) became the life-giving principle in the 
human being. Philo refers to this as the “fragment of the Deity.” It reminds the individual that 
he or she is bound to God. Philo also states that the mind in humans is holy. He likens the 
mind’s role to the body to that of heaven and earth. He says that just as the heavens can praise 
the Creator, so too can the human mind. He argues that this uniqueness between the heavens 
and the mind make both holy. He adds: “For these two things, the heaven[s] and the mind, are 
the things which are able to utter, with all becoming dignity, the praises, and hymns, and glory, 
and beatitude of the Father who created them.”22 The mind is not special because it sings the 
praises of God; rather, it sings the praises of God because it is special. Philo holds that there is 
an intrinsic feature of the human mind, which accords it a special relationship with the divine. 
This feature is extensively described when Philo comments on Lev 3:12. Although the text 
                                                        
19 Philo, “On the Creation,” in The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged, trans. 
by C. D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 69. 
20 Philo, “On the Creation,” 69. 
21 Philo, “On Dreams,” 34. 
22 Philo, “On Dreams,” 35. 
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here refers to the election of the Levites for the priestly ministry over the other children of 
Israel, Philo presumes that it points to God’s elevation of the mind above every other faculty.23 
This quote raises some interesting phrases: “God’s suppliant” and “God’s share.”24 The mind 
mediates between humans and the divine—God’s suppliant; it is also humanity’s way of 
participating in the divine—God’s share; and the divine abiding in humanity. This reading of 
the Torah is inspired by a philosophical interpretative framework. 
 
Nous in Josephus 
Josephus uses nous in three senses: thought, mindset, and discernment. He departs from 
the philosophical idea of nous as something ethereal that makes the One present in humans. 
The other striking feature of nous in Josephus’s works is the preponderant phrase kata noun 
(according to one’s mind). Kata noun indicates the dominant idea of nous in Josephus’s 
writings: thought. This term suggests thought and occurs in most instances where nous 
designates “one’s mind.” But in some cases, it means one’s wish or mindset. I shall now discuss 
some of the relevant passages in Josephus’s writings beginning with the instances referring to 
the human mind. Antiquities of the Jews 1:245 features the first of the kata noun phrases. It 
denotes Abraham’s wish for his son’s marriage. The text reads: “…Her [Rebecca] whom 
Abraham sent him, as his servant, to espouse to his son, in case his will (kata noun) were that 
this marriage … be consummated….” Nous here refers to Abraham’s wish or his “thought” for 
the marriage. It is his intention (or will) for the marriage between Rebecca and Isaac. In Ant 
4:111, Josephus says: “…He [Balaam] should declare nothing but what he himself [Balaam] 
                                                        
23 Philo writes: “Reason which fled to God and became his suppliant, is what is here 
called the Levite; God having taken this from the most central and dominant part of the soul 
… and appropriated it as his own share, thought it worthy of the honor due to the first-born.” 
Philo, “The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain,” in The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged, 
trans. by C. D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 119. 
24 Ibid. 
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should suggest to his mind (kata noun).” Nous here refers to Balaam’s decision or thinking. 
The sentence can easily be rephrased to read: Balaam should say what he thinks. Josephus 
continues with this usage in Ant 4:267: “…When the Jewish affairs shall, by the blessing of 
God, be to their [the borrowers’] own mind (kata noun).” The context for this quote is the 
prohibition of usury among Hebrew people, who are urged to receive the same value for items 
lent without interest. Nous thus signifies the intention, wish, or decision of the borrowers 
mentioned. It is the same as the borrowers’ “thoughts.” 
In Ant 6:287, Josephus recounts David’s plight for mercy from King Saul. David 
appeals to Saul not to listen to the awful things said about him. David also begs Saul to judge 
him by his character and not by people’s words. Nous appears in a portion of this conversion: 
“…And not to believe those who frame such accusations against me [David] as never came 
into my mind (eis noun).” A paraphrase of this quote is: do not frame me (David) for what I 
never thought of. Nous here refers to thinking. In Ant 7:92, Josephus tells his version of the 
David-Nathan story on the building of the temple. In Josephus’s account, God turns down the 
request of David because he had been defiled by the slaughter of his enemies. Nous is used in 
speaking about the temple. The text reads: “…Since no one had before now taken it into their 
(sic) head (eis noun balomenou) to build him [God] a temple….” The Greek phrase states: 
“thrown into the mind.” It means “conceived of” building the temple. The sense of nous here 
is thought. It can easily be rephrased to say: no one prior to this moment has ever thought of 
building a temple.  
Josephus retains the idea of thought in Ant 7:186. The larger context of Josephus’s use 
of nous here is Joab’s intervention in David’s anger over Absalom. Joab bribed an elderly 
woman to approach David and to request him to pardon Absalom. When David realized that 
the woman’s story was the invention of Joab, he asked Joab to fetch Absalom. David told Joab 
that he had forgiven Absalom. The text reads: “…He [David] called for Joab, and told him he 
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had obtained what he requested, according to his own mind (kata noun).” Kata noun thus 
implies David’s discovery of the truth, “according to his own mind” (that is, he realized that 
Joab fabricated the story to awaken his conscience). In Ant 11:335, Josephus recounts 
Alexander the Great’s dream of conquering Darius, the Persian Emperor, and extending the 
frontiers of Greek hegemony to Asia. The text reads: “…All things [plans to defeat Darius] 
will succeed according to what is in my [Alexander’s] own mind (kata noun).” Kata noun in 
this instance is convertible with Alexander’s thoughts or plans to conquer Persia. 
In Ant 12:55, Eleazer, the Jewish high priest, writes King Ptolemy to reassure him of 
their unwavering support and the good will of the Jewish people. As a gesture of loyalty or 
fealty, Eleazar says: “We offered sacrifices for you … that your [King Ptolemy’s] affairs may 
be to your mind (kata noun)….” Kata noun here refers to the intentions, thoughts, or desires 
of King Ptolemy for his kingdom. An identical usage of nous is found in Ant 13:163. The 
context for this quote is the victory of Jonathan’s army over its enemies. Josephus reports that 
two thousand soldiers (from the enemy’s camp) were slain at the battle. After the resounding 
victory and Jonathan’s return to Jerusalem, he plans a trip to Rome in other to solidify Roman-
Jewish ties. The text says: “When he [Jonathan] saw that all had prospered according to his 
mind (kata noun) … he sent ambassadors to the Romans….” Nous here is comparable to 
Jonathan’s thought, wish or plan. In Ant 14:278, Josephus narrates the reconciliation between 
Malichus and Antiphater. He says that Malichus, being a man of great cunning, deceived 
Antiphater into empathizing with him and pardoning him. The text reads: “…and [Malichus] 
said, that while Phasaelus had a garrison in Jerusalem, and Herod had the weapons of war in 
his custody, he [Malichus] could never have a thought (nous) of any such thing.” Nous is 
correctly translated as thought, because it refers to the content of Malichus’s thinking. In Ant 
14:454, Josephus writes about a king who besieged Jericho to avenge the death of his brother: 
“Then did the king march hastily to Jericho, intending (kata noun) to avenge himself on the 
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enemy for the slaughter of his brother….” To determine the sense of nous here, I will look at 
the Greek briefly. It reads: timoresasthai (to punish by himself) kata noun echon (having 
according to his mind) autous (them). A possible paraphrase reads: the king thought of 
punishing them (his brother’s murderers) personally. Thus nous implies a thought or a plan.  
In Ant 16:194, Josephus recounts Pheroras’s flirtation with a slave girl and his disdain 
for his fiancée, the princess: “…He [Pheroras] despised the king’s daughter, to whom he had 
been betrothed, and wholly bent his mind (nous) to the other, who had been but a servant.” 
This means that Pheroras thought of and desired the female slave. Nous here alludes to 
Pheroras’s thought: his interest in the female slave. Josephus uses nous in a similar way when 
he describes Sylleus’s infatuation for Salome: “…Sylleus … saw Salome and set his heart 
(noun) upon her….” Albeit the text says “heart” because the context favors an emotionally 
appropriate word, the same meaning can be expressed differently: Sylleus saw Salome and 
thought only of her. Nous in this quote refers to Sylleus’s feelings for or thoughts of Salome. 
In Ant 20:76, Josephus says that when Monobazus and his kindred saw that people admired 
Izates for his piety, they chose to abandon their country and to embrace the customs of the 
Jews. Izates’s subjects probably leaked this information, and it stirred the fury of the high 
nobles: “But [the high nobles] had an intention (kata noun), when they should find a proper 
opportunity, to inflict a punishment upon them [Monobazus and his kindred].” Kata noun 
signifies the “thoughts” of the high nobles. Nous again means thought.  
In the Life of Flavius Josephus 1:122, Josephus says that John disliked him, because of 
his successes. Josephus enumerates the following successes: admiration from subordinates and 
the enemy’s dread of him. He writes: “…John … was informed how all things had succeeded 
to my [Flavius Josephus] mind (kata noun)….” Kata noun alludes to Josephus’s thoughts. It 
encompasses his aspirations. In Against Apion 2:142, Josephus accuses Apion of being “blind 
in mind,” because he reproached his own people (the Jews) and their customs on account of 
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the Egyptians. The text reads: “Apion was therefore quite blinded in his mind (noun)….” Nous 
here refers to Apion’s thinking or decisions. In Ant 8:23, Josephus, while retelling the story of 
Solomon’s prayer after his enthronement, nuances his understanding of nous: “‘Give me, O 
Lord, a healthy mind (noun hugie) and good understanding.’” A “healthy mind” empowers the 
king to make sound judgments. It also enables the king to discern issues thoughtfully. Nous in 
this phrase denotes rationality or discernment. It is more profound than thought, and is certainly 
not mindset. But this “healthy mind” is a discernment that originates from careful thinking. 
Josephus also uses nous in an equivocal way: to mean wish or thought. Antiquities of 
the Jews 13:166 features the letter of Jonathan, the high priest of the Jews, to the Roman senate. 
In this letter, Jonathan wishes Rome well: “If you be well, and both your public and private 
affairs be agreeable to your mind (kata noun), it is according to our wishes. We are also well.” 
Kata noun refers to the state’s aspirations: peace, prosperity, and victory. So nous means a 
pleasant wish. In Jewish Wars 4:622, Josephus says that Vespasian’s good fortunes helped him 
to realize his wishes: “So Vespasian’s good fortunes succeeded to (sic) his wishes (kata noun) 
everywhere….” In this sentence, nous indicates Vespasian’s aspirations and desires. It also 
means “thought.” There is an identical usage in Jewish Wars 7:119. Here Josephus narrates 
Titus’s voyage into Egypt and his satisfaction with its completion: “So when he had a 
prosperous voyage to his mind (kata noun)….” This means that the voyage met Vespasian’s 
expectations and desires (and thoughts).  
Josephus uses nous as mindset. In Ant 1:20, Josephus emphasizes contemplation for a 
legislator who wishes to be virtuous: “Neither could the legislator himself have a right mind 
(noun agathon) without such a contemplation….” Nous denotes mindset—the legislator’s way 
of thinking. In Ant 5:319, Josephus maintains the idea of nous as mindset. The context for this 
passage is the story of Elimelech and Naomi. It recounts how Elimelech took his wife Naomi 
and two sons to Moab, when the famine in Israel became unbearable. While Elimelech was in 
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Moab, he got wives for his two sons. The text reads: “…And upon the happy prosperity of his 
[Elimelech’s] affairs (kata noun) there, he took for his sons, wives of the Moabites….”  Kata 
noun ton pragmaton (according to his work) is the phrase translated as “his affairs.” But the 
idea Josephus is trying to communicate is that Elimelech got wives for his two sons when his 
economic situation improved. Kata noun does not mean “thought,” but is better rendered 
mindset (his perception of the economic situation). Thus nous in Josephus primarily means 
thought. In special contexts, it could mean mindset or discernment. 
 
Nous in Neoplatonism 
The source of all being, for Plotinus, is the One, which subsists in every being, yet must 
not be identified with anything. The One is transcendent, motionless, and perfect. It is the fount 
of all being and intellection. It is present in all things in a transcendental sense—it has the 
archetype of all beings, or their ideal forms.25  In its fullest self-communication, the One 
communicates itself to the divine mind (nous), which becomes the intellectual-principle for 
every created thing in the universe. The divine mind is the perfect representation of the One, 
and is generated through a motionless process of self-intellection by the One. It is distinct from 
the One not in being, but in the logical process of emanation and causation of being. The divine 
mind, characterized by the intellectual-principle, generates the soul. The soul, unlike the divine 
mind, is prone to motion. In its act of self-intellection, it generates sense and nature, the vegetal 
principle.26 This downward flow of being, for Plotinus, is the theory of emanation.  
                                                        
25 Plotinus, “The Origin and Order of the ‘Beings Following on the First,’” The Fifth 
Ennead, in The Enneads: A New Definitive Edition with Comparisons to Other Translations 
on Hundreds of Key Passages, trans. by Stephen MacKenna (Burdett: Paul Brunton 
Philosophic Foundation, 1992), 1. 
26 Plotinus believes that being is diminished when it goes downward (emanation). As 
such, the world of nature (animals and plants) is considered lesser in being than humans. The 
vegetal principle refers to the last stage of emanation, according to Plotinus’s theory. 
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Although emanation follows a downward movement, Plotinus believes that an upward 
movement preserves the being of all generated things: the contemplation of the source of their 
being. This upward movement is regarded as the theory of “perfection.” The divine mind, 
which proceeds from the One, participates in this cosmic perfection when it gazes on the One, 
in order to retain the latter’s form. The soul, in its quest for perfection, looks up to the divine 
mind, as its origin and exemplar. By so doing, the order of things in the universe is maintained 
and all generated beings are in harmony with each other. This emanation and “retrospection” 
of various levels of beings safeguard the bond of unity in the cosmos. Confirming this, Plotinus 
writes: “For its [the soul’s] perfecting, it must look to that Divine Mind, which may be thought 
of as a father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with 
himself.”27 Perfection, in this context, does not imply moral rectitude, but the striving toward 
the goal of the being’s generation. The unity in the universe is concretely achieved by the 
succeeding being’s retrospection of the preceding being. In its intellection, the soul acquaints 
itself with its imperfection, which means its depreciation in being, in comparison with its 
source. According to this theory of perfection, the human mind can only be made perfect when 
it gazes on the divine mind, its source and exemplar. The human mind’s contemplation of the 
divine mind is the core of its perfection. Plotinus also stresses the interrelationship between the 
divine mind and the human mind. He says that the interrelationship between these two minds 
is enhanced by two principles: (1) a recognition by the human mind of the preeminence of the 
divine mind; and (2) the affirmation of the immanence of the divine mind in the human soul. 
He says: “In two ways … the Intellectual-Principle [used interchangeably with the Divine 
Mind] enhances the divine quality of the Soul, as father and as immanent presence; nothing 
separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same, [and] that there is 
                                                        
27 Plotinus, “The Three Initial Hypostases,” The Fifth Ennead, 3. 
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succession….”28 Plotinus divinizes human reason and perceives it to be humanity’s gateway 
to divine life and its remote link to the One. Also, he states that the human mind is the divine 
element in the human person. This means that the human mind, being an integral part of cosmic 
emanation, is immortal and ethereal. 
Regarding the first, Plotinus argues that the human mind, like its soul, proceeds from 
the divine mind; it owes its existence to the latter. The human mind is the divine image in the 
world. It mirrors the divine mind in its fullest grandeur. Plotinus reiterates this: “Reason uttered 
is an image of the reason stored….” 29  The human mind’s “perfection” consists in 
contemplating the divine mind. Another angle to this claim of Plotinus is that the human mind 
is the link between the divine realm of perfect forms and ideas, and the world of sense and 
nature. Second, Plotinus claims that the divine mind actively participates in the human mind. 
This means that the human mind can discern the divine mind, because the latter subsists in the 
former. Distinctive functions or processes of the human mind, like rationality, are hence 
considered to be the remote handiwork of the divine mind. The human mind is not just an 
imperfect copy of the divine mind or an imitation of it, but is its inhabitation in the created 
universe. From what we have seen so far, Plotinus’ doctrine of nous can succinctly be stated: 
(1) the divine nous proceeds from the One, which is present in everything in the universe; (2) 
this same divine nous envelops the perfect copies of everything in the world and is their origin; 
(3) the human nous emanates from the divine nous, although it is an imperfect copy of the 
latter; (4) the divine nous inhabits the human nous; and (5) the human nous is made perfect 
through contemplation, or “retrospection” of the divine nous.  
 
Summary 
                                                        
28 Plotinus, “The Three Initial Hypostases,” 3. 
29 Plotinus, “The Three Initial Hypostases,” 3. 
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In this chapter, we examined the use of nous in the socio-religious context of Paul: the 
Hebrew Scriptures—the proto-canonical and the deuterocanonical books, Middle Platonism, 
Philo’s works, Josephus’s writings, and Neoplatonism. In the proto-canonical books of the 
Bible, the LXX translates lev as nous in contexts where the Hebrew word for heart had at least 
one of these three nuances: first, whenever it refers to a rational process like thought, 
understanding, or planning; second, whenever heart is used figuratively; and third, whenever 
the operative verb in the sentence implies thought. All the instances considered in this chapter 
had at least one of these three categories. Also, it should be noted that the only verse the LXX 
renders as nous that does not use lev in the Hebrew, Isa 40:13, is the one Paul cites for nous. 
The LXX, mindful of rational connotation of nous, translates the Hebrew ruah as nous. The 
deuterocanonical books were studied separately, because they are a collection of texts of Greek 
origin. In these books, nous refers to a person’s disposition, thinking, or worldview, and, in 4 
Maccabees, to the human mind in a philosophical sense. Nous in these writings is remarkably 
nuanced to emphasize the preeminence of rationality over the bodily senses. Also, at this stage, 
nous had been purged of any idea of corporeality. It evinces an apparent dissociation from the 
Hebrew idea of a “physical organ.” It is used in an immaterial sense. Fourth Maccabees’ idea 
of nous leads logically to the Hellenistic discussion on the subject.  
In Middle Platonism, nous primarily refers to the Demiurge. This mystical being is the 
“middle man” in creation. The Demiurge bridges the gap between the One and creatures. It 
secures the One’s presence in creation. Middle Platonists differ in their explication of this 
principle.  Philo endorses the Middle Platonists’ idea of the nous. But his reading is allegorical. 
Philo claims that the human nous is the breath of life bestowed by the Creator. Appealing to 
the Second Account of creation, he says that the “breath of life,” which animated the motionless 
human body, is nous. This gift, for Philo, becomes God’s way of preserving and sustaining 
humanity. Philo also, regarding the First Account of creation, says that nous refers to the imago 
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Dei. Here, he says that the nous is that noble feature which singles out the human person from 
all other creatures. Being God’s image, for Philo, makes it possible for humans to praise and 
worship God. This office of praising the Creator is likewise shared by the heavens. The last 
bold claim that Philo makes is that nous is God’s place in the human soul—it is the means 
through which the divine indwells humans. Philo picked up this insight from his allegorical 
reading of the priestly election of the Levites. He says that just as the Levites were chosen from 
the children of Israel, God has chosen the human nous as the divine portion from all the other 
faculties in the human person, and, by extension, over all other creatures. 
Josephus uses nous mainly as human thought. This idea is consistent throughout his 
writings, except for his account on Solomon’s election by God. In this narrative, Josephus 
employs nous as discernment. The other nuance Josephus gives the nous is mindset. Albeit 
there are three variants for nous in Josephus, one can argue for a unity in them all: thought. 
Discernment is thinking profoundly, while mindset is thinking in a certain way. The divine 
nous in Neoplatonism is the principle of generation for all created things in the universe. It 
contains the archetypal form of everything in the world, and is the first self-emanation, or 
explication of the transcendent One. By holding the perfect forms of all things, it becomes the 
primary yardstick for determining what is perfect (like its forms) and what is not (unlike its 
forms). The first self-communication of the divine nous begets the soul, the place wherein the 
human nous resides. The human nous is the link between divine nous, and, by extension, the 
One, and the vegetative order: the world of sense and nature. The outpouring of being down 
the ladder, and the retrospection of being up the ladder sustain the unity in the universe, for 
Plotinus. The upward movement is referred to as perfection, or quasi-retrospection, while the 
movement is called emanation.  
CHAPTER TWO 
NOUS IN PAUL’S LETTERS AND IN THE NT 
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For some time, scholars have been divided on how to interpret Paul’s assertion: “We 
have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor 2:16). Some have argued that the phrase nous Christou refers 
to a Christ-like mindset, while others say it alludes to the transforming work of the Spirit.30 
Divergence in the interpretation of the text has also resulted from the imposition of different 
anthropological and philosophical frameworks on Paul, whether Jewish ones (e.g., using 
Josephus or Philo), or Greek ones (e.g., Middle Platonism or Neoplatonism). The emphasis 
was hardly on the LXX’s probable influence on Paul or his literary ingenuity.31 In this chapter, 
I will argue that Paul’s terminology was primarily influenced by the LXX’s concept of nous, 
but in 1 Cor 2:16, Paul ingeniously conflates his LXX heritage (the term) with the pervading 
Greek philosophy (the Spirit’s action in the ekklēsia). So I will investigate all the appearances 
of nous in the NT, beginning with the Pauline corpus. The undisputed letters will be treated 
first, and then the disputed letters. Next, I will analyze the appearances of the term in Luke and 
Revelation. As we have already seen, Paul employs nous in two senses: mindset and human 
                                                        
30 Those who argue that nous Christou refers to God’s Spirit include: Hans 
Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. by 
James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 69; Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the 
Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters, 2nd Edition (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 290; and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Yale Bible 32 (New Haven: 
Yale University, 2008), 185-186. Those who claim that nous Christou means mindset 
include: Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2014), 128; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 275-276; Roy E. Ciampa 
and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, edited by D. A. Carson (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 138; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians Sacra Pagina 7, edited 
by Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1999), 138. However, all those who argue 
for mindset believe it is a “mode of thought” that is enabled or inspired by the Spirit of 
Christ. 
31 Some scholars argue for the influence of Greek philosophy on Paul’s nous. Among 
these scholars, few make it very explicit: Pheme Perkins, First Corinthians Paideia (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 62; Emma Wasserman, “Paul Beyond the 
Judaism/Hellenism Divide? The Case of Pauline Anthropology in Romans 7 and 2 
Corinthians 4-5,” in Christian Origins and Hellenistic Judaism: Social and Literary Contexts 
for the New Testament, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts (Boston: Leiden, 
2013), 259. 
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understanding. This trend continues in the disputed letters (mindset) and in Luke and 
Revelation (human understanding empowered by divine inspiration). Paul’s usage is thus in 
line with all other uses of the term in the NT. The exceptions to this pattern is 1 Cor 2:16 
(mindset) and Rom 7 (understanding). In 1 Cor 2:16, the nous Christou denotes a Christ-like 
mindset that is inspired, enlivened, and sustained in the ekklēsia by God’s Spirit. In Rom 7, 
nous refers to the rationality of the Adamic person. But these exceptions are comparable to the 
established pattern: mindset and reasoning. Their peculiarity consists in Paul’s literary 
ingenuity and creative rhetorical adaptation of the term to imbue it with a fresh impetus. 
Regarding the nous Christou, I will also argue that the phrase refers to a mystical way 
of making Christ concretely present through the action of a Spirit-inspired mindset. This idea 
is informed by Paul’s directive in 1 Cor 5:3. The text reads: “For though absent in body, I am 
present in spirit….” Paul believes he is present in the ekklēsia through his spirit. Likewise, the 
Spirit does not only inspire a Christ-like mindset, but it makes Christ concretely present in the 
ekklēsia, when people convene in the “name of the Lord.”32 This “spiritual” presence is only 
applicable to the ekklēsia. Paul’s emphasis too shows that his spirit is his way of being in 
solidarity with the ekklēsia. The nous Christou too is conferred by the Spirit to make Christ 
present in the ekklēsia. Possession of the nous Christou, like the nous of Greek philosophy, is 
a sort of ontological character of the ekklēsia (deeply ingrained in its being) that marks it as 
Christ’s body. This association will be explored later. The Spirit is also the architect and 
                                                        
32 Paul speaks of his spirit being present when the community is gathered. The phrase 
reads: sunachthentōn humin kai tou emou pneumatos (summoning you and my spirit). Paul 
firmly believes he is concretely present in the assembly through his spirit. The context is 
Paul’s condemnation of a man who was having sexual relations with his father’s wife. Paul’s 
emphasis here is simple: when the community is assembled in the power of Christ Jesus, they 
will be acting in accordance with his “mindset”: doing what he would have done if he were 
present. This image (allusion to Paul’s spirit) is most likely implied when he speaks of the 
nous Christou, such that the possession of a Spirit-inspired mindset is not merely having 
Christ’s way of thinking, but is the ekklēsia’s identity that makes Christ visibly present. 
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enforcer of communal Christification.33 This mindset, fashioned and inculcated by the Spirit, 
engenders the ekklēsia’s conformity to the imago Christou and makes it Christ’s body.34 
 
Nous as “Mindset” in the Undisputed Letters 
After the customary greeting in 1 Cor 1:1-9, Paul addresses the issue of division. He 
exhorts the Corinthians: “I appeal to you … that all of you be in agreement and that there be 
no divisions among you, but that you be united in the same mind (nous) and the same purpose” 
(1 Cor 1:10). This appeal is an antidote to the antidote to the existing faction. Five phrases are 
remarkable in this admonition: “be in agreement,” “no divisions among you,” “be united,” 
“same mind,” and “same purpose.” These parallel phrases drive home a single point: the pith 
of ecclesial unity is Christ, and no one else. Paul rhetorically underscores this stance: “What I 
mean is that each of you says, ‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to 
Cephas,’ or ‘I belong to Christ.’ Has Christ been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were 
you baptized in the name of Paul” (1 Cor 1:12-13)? This means that the “same mind” must be 
antithetical to the division described by Paul, but identical to the exhortation to be united, in 
agreement and of the same purpose. I will now examine each of these phrases to see how they 
illumine our understanding of the “same mind” in this context. 
                                                        
33 Paul argues that no one understands what is truly divine except God’s Spirit. The 
Spirit is the one who interprets the gifts bestowed on the community by God (1 Cor 2:11-12). 
Paul also holds that the Spirit necessitates the radical transformation of the community from a 
vicious lifestyle to a saintly (Paul uses this word in a basic sense: the holy ones) calling. The 
community is washed, sanctified and justified by the Spirit, in the name of Jesus: the 
community is modelled after Christ (1 Cor 6:11). The Spirit also molds the baptized into one 
body: the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:13). Becoming one body in Christ is the end-point of 
having the same mindset: nous Christou. This is the meaning of Christification. 
34 Cruciform (literal meaning “cross-shaped”) refers to the characteristic feature of 
Paul’s gospel, which emphasizes the crucifixion of Christ and is the spectacle through which 
he views reality: “… We proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews and 
foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power 
of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:24). Imago Christou means the image and likeness 
of Christ crucified. 
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The phrase translated as “be in agreement” (hina to auto legēte pantes) is literally, “that 
all may speak the same thing.” This appeal is directed at those propagating divisive views and 
threatening the ecclesial unity. “Be in agreement” is the positive parallel for “let there be no 
division among you” (mē en humin schismata). Paul uses the subjunctive verb in both instances 
to show that this unity is a desiradatum. But it also implies that this unity is apparently absent. 
The second pair of phrases “same mind” and “same purpose,” reiterates the need for ecclesial 
unity. Paul firmly believes that the ekklēsia is Christ’s body (1 Cor 12:27). Since in Christ there 
is no division (1 Cor 1:13), the ekklēsia must expunge all factions. The second phrase extolling 
unity contains a notable verb katartizō, which means to “restore (to a prior condition) or to set 
aright.” It reads: hēte de katērtismenoi en tōi autōi noi kai en tē autēi gnōmē (“but be restored 
in the same mind and in the same purpose”—au. trans.). Paul’s use of the subjunctive 
presupposes that the ekklēsia’s unity is being threatened by some people’s unwillingness to 
“speak as one” and to “think as one.” Paul’s admonition to the ekklēsia to restore its “same 
mind” and “same purpose” alludes to the integral unity of the community as the visible body 
of Christ. 
Raymond F. Collins observes that schismata is imbued with political connotation. He 
writes: “In political rhetoric schisma was figuratively used of a division of opinion or a cleft in 
political consciousness….”35 Schisma is akin to katartizō which delineates the “calming of 
political unrest, the appeasement of factions, and the restoration of political unity.”36 Paul thus 
uses well-known political imagery to denigrate the existing divisions in the ekklēsia, and to 
liken the church at Corinth to the secular groups. Paul is stretching the church’s division by 
likening it to political parties; or rather, he is underscoring the Christ-believers at Corinth’s 
departure from the path set out for them: the way of the mind of Christ.  
                                                        
35 Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians Sacra Pagina 7, ed. Daniel J. Harrington 
(Collegeville: Liturgical, 1999), 77. 
36 Ibid. 
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Another way of looking at Paul’s exhortation is to consider the first phrases (“be in 
agreement” and “same mind”) to be the fulfillment of the second phrases (“no division among 
you” and “same purpose”). To forestall the division in the ekklēsia, the people need to “speak 
as one,” while in order to have a common purpose, they need to “think as one.” The verb 
katartizō, besides denoting “restoration,” also means to “make complete.” So the phrase could 
also be read as “be perfect in the same mind and purpose.” This means that an excellent 
paraphrase for Paul’s argument is: if you agree with each other, there will be no division among 
you; and if you have the same mind, you can strive toward the same purpose. Either way, nous 
denotes a mindset—a way of thinking that makes having and striving toward a common 
purpose possible, and rids the ekklēsia of all forms of divisions. 
Michael J. Gorman notes that the language in 1 Cor 1:10 reechoes Paul’s language in 1 
Cor 2:16 and Phil 2:6-11. He claims that the connection between these three passages is the 
nous Christou—a Christ-like mindset. 37  As in Phil 2:6-11, Gorman argues that Paul’s 
condemnation of the rivalry sects at Corinth is based on his conviction in the crucified Lord 
and his self-emptying for humanity’s salvation. In this self-emptying, God’s power and the 
gospel of Jesus Christ shine through human frailty and brings about the conversion of people 
from every race. As Gorman rightly observes, Paul’s argument is rhetorically marshalled out: 
the success of the good news must never be attributed to preachers or their “showy rhetoric,” 
but to the power of the cross.38 The nous Christou disapproves of self-aggrandizement and 
promotes a neutral ground for church unity: life in Christ. Gorman insinuates that nous here 
means mindset. His explanation makes this obvious. Albeit I agree with Gorman’s reasoning, 
I will argue later that nous Christou entails more than what Gorman describes: it is an intrinsic 
quality of the ekklēsia. 
                                                        
37 Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to 
Paul and His Letters, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 286. 
38 Ibid., 287. 
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In Rom 1:28, Paul uses nous as a way of thinking. The text reads: “And since they did 
not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind (nous) and to things that 
should not be done.” The “debased mind” which the ungodly and the wicked were given up to 
leads to a vicious and immoral lifestyle, which is explained in the preceding verse and is echoed 
in the subsequent ones. The verb “give up” (paradōken) occurs two other times in the 
immediately preceding verses (Rom 1:24, 26), each time with some immoral object: the lusts 
of their hearts to impurity, the degrading of their bodies, and their degrading passions. These 
immoral acts describe the perverted mindset of the wicked. It is a mindset that refuses to honor 
or give thanks to God (Rom 1:21); a way of life that substitutes the “glory of God” for idols 
(Rom 1:23); a worldview that leads to the loss of the human integrity enshrined in the imago 
Dei (Rom 1:26-27). Nous here means the “disposition” that makes these licentious acts 
possible. Frank J. Matera calls this disposition the “undiscerning mind,” which is unable and 
unwilling to distinguish between what is acceptable and what is not, what praises the Creator 
and what is self-serving.39 This “undiscerning mind” is clearly a mindset. 
In Rom 12:2, Paul tells “the brothers and the sisters” to present their bodies to God as 
a “living sacrifice,” which is holy and acceptable. This living sacrifice, Paul insists, is a 
“thoughtful (meaningful; logikē) worship” that is pleasing to God. It is achieved through the 
renewal of the mind and the refusal to be conformed to “this age.” This verse introduces the 
“ethical” segment of the Letter to the Romans. Nous signifies mindset. This becomes evident 
when we consider the word’s relationship to two phrases in the sentence: “conformed to this 
age” and “discern what is God’s will.” The “renewal of the mind” is the antithesis of being 
conformed to the present age. Paul spells this out using the prohibitive mē before “being 
conformed to this age,” and the adversative alla to introduce the “renewal of mind.” Hence, 
                                                        
39 Frank J. Matera, Romans, Paideia: Commentaries on the New Testament (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 53. 
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the only way to avoid being conformed to this age is through the renewal of one’s mind, which 
brings about the discernment of God’s will. The renewal of mind evokes the “debased mind” 
used in chapter one. Just as the “debased mind” led to dishonorable passions and the 
denigration of human integrity, the “renewal of the mind” now leads to the knowledge of and 
the performance of God’s will. There are three fruits of the “renewed mind”: good (beneficial 
to individuals), acceptable (builds up the ekklēsia), and perfect (aids individuals to attain life’s 
goal). So the renewed mindset is the crucial link between Paul’s “theological” treatise and his 
“ethical” exhortation. The mind designates a mindset that is debased or discerning. If the 
ekklēsia’s mindset is renewed, then Paul’s ensuing exhortation becomes feasible: “I say to 
everyone among you not to think of yourself more highly than you ought to think, but to think 
with sober judgment, each according to the measure of faith that God has assigned” (Rom 
12:3). 
 
Nous as Human Understanding in the Undisputed Letters 
In Phil 4:7, Paul uses nous as understanding. It reads: “And the peace of God, which 
surpasses all understanding (nous), will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus.” 
Panta noun (singular) is the object of the active, feminine participle hē huperechousa, which, 
given Paul’s “eucharistic” tone, alludes to God’s overwhelming power that exceeds human 
comprehension.40 Nous refers to rationality and to the human quest of making spiritual events 
intelligible. Paul encourages the Philippians not to despair or to be fixated on their present 
humiliation (Phil 3:21), but to thank God in all things: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I 
                                                        
40 Eucharisteō is the Greek verb for thanksgiving. The tone in the concluding part of 
Paul’s letter to the Philippians is that of thanksgiving. Ironically, Paul’s stresses the theme of 
thanksgiving in this letter, amidst his imprisonment and suffering. The logic and source of 
Paul’s gratitude is God’s faithfulness which surpasses human comprehension. Paul’s attitude 
is best captured by his exhortation: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice” (Phil 
4:4). 
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say, rejoice” (Phil 4:4). The eucharistic disposition and the comportment of gentleness, for 
Paul, should characterize an ekklēsia awaiting the parousia (Phil 4:5). It is the hallmark of an 
assembly whose citizenship is in heaven (Phil 3:20). Nous is interchangeable with rationality 
or human understanding in this passage. 
In 1 Cor 14:14-15, nous denotes human understanding. The context is an admonition 
on glossōlalia (speaking in tongues). Paul recognizes glossōlalia as the Spirit’s gift to the 
ekklēsia; but he expresses concern about its usage. For Paul, those who have received this gift 
from the Spirit should exercise it bearing one goal in mind: the building up of the ekklēsia (1 
Cor 14:5b, 12). Since every gift of the Spirit is intended for the building up of the ekklēsia, 
glossōlalia’s merit is dependent on its fruitfulness in the community. Thus Paul says: “If in a 
tongue you utter speech that is not intelligible, how will anyone know what is being said? For 
you will be speaking into the air” (1 Cor 14:9). Now, since the Spirit’s gift of interpretation is 
integral to speaking in tongues in the ekklēsia, Paul’s exhortation for the gift of interpretation 
to be exercised when glossōlalia takes place is a question of intelligibility and the building up 
of the ekklēsia. Hence, in 1 Cor 14:14-15, nous is equivalent to rationality (illumined by the 
gift of interpretation), while spirit refers to the part of the human person that receives the life 
of grace. Nous is applied here in a neutral sense.  
Paul does not employ nous as the antithesis of the pneuma, as some argue, but as the 
human faculty that should be enlightened by the Spirit’s gift of interpretation. Paul does not 
demean nous; rather, he extols it as the “bridge builder” in the ekklēsia. Paul’s exhortation is 
firmly rooted in the conviction: the gifts of the Spirit are intended for the building up of the 
ekklēsia. To reiterate this, Paul writes: “In [the] church, I would rather speak five words with 
my mind (nous)… to instruct others … than ten thousand words in a tongue” (1 Cor 14:19). 
So, albeit Paul does not prohibit glossōlalia, he urges the ekklēsia to consider ways of using 
this gift that will be most beneficial to the growth of the assembly. To achieve this goal, when 
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one speaks in tongues in the ekklēsia, there must be someone else endowed with the gift of 
interpretation to explain what is said. This organization fosters the ecclesial growth. So, even 
though nous and pneuma are distinct terms, they are not mutually exclusive: nous needs to be 
aided by the Spirit to be effective. Robert Jewett foregrounds my interpretation of nous as 
rationality. He says that the belief that the mind must make an exit before ecstasy begins was 
widespread in Greek mystery religions. He argues that Paul, contrary to the position of the 
enthusiasts who claimed that glossolalia was “completely uncontrollable,” held that it could be 
effectively managed for the building up of the ekklēsia. As such, Jewett claims that when Paul 
uses nous against the enthusiasts, what he means is “the source of conscious self-control and 
of clear communication of ideas.”41 Jewett also defines nous as an “agent of rationality” that 
instills a “sense of sober self-control and simple communication” into the ekklēsia.42 Jewett 
reads nous primarily as rationality, illumined by the Spirit’s gift of interpretation. 
In Rom 14:5, Paul uses nous too as human reason or understanding. Most likely, Paul 
was presented with the issue of observing festive days in the Jewish calendar and the practice 
of abstinence. While adjudicating this matter, Paul says: “Let all be fully convinced in their 
own minds (nous)” (Rom 14:5b). This means: let each one follow his or her own conviction, 
because this is not a matter of immense importance: divergent views on such matters do not 
affect the cruciform witness of the ekklēsia. But a lack of charity in respecting the opinions of 
others may affect the assembly’s witness. Nous here functions as understanding or reasoning. 
Nous refers to each member’s ability to think through the matter. It upholds people’s rights to 
use their reasoning in assessing “grey areas.” Paul respects divergence of opinions on this 
subject, because it is not a threat to his gospel.  
                                                        
41 Robert Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict 
Settings, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 379. 
42 Ibid., 379. 
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In 2 Thess 2:2, Paul encourages the “brothers and sisters,” regarding the parousia, not 
to be “quickly shaken in mind (nous) or alarmed, either by spirit or by word or by letter….” 
Paul employs saleuthēnai metaphorically (to shake or tremble). Saleuthēnai usually describes 
the trembling of a building’s foundations or the shaking of stationary objects. For instance, in 
Acts 4:31, Luke says: “When they had all prayed, the place in which they were gathered 
together was shaken (esaleuthē).” The verb here means worry or anxiety (“shaken” in mind). 
What is “shaken” is people’s thoughts. Paul addresses the anxiety that a false alarm about the 
parousia engenders. To allay people’s anxiety, Paul insists that there will be signs heralding 
this event. Nous here means thought and is in line with the LXX’s usage. I will now examine 
nous in Rom 7:23-25 which is a nuanced form of human understanding. 
 
Nous in Rom 7:23-25 
 Although nous only occurs in the concluding verses of Rom 7, I will examine the wider 
context for its appearance before looking at Rom 7:23-25, which features the highly disputed 
egō. Scholars are divided on how best to interpret the egō and its literary context.43 The use of 
different tenses—past (Rom 7:7-13) and present tenses (Rom 7:14-25)—suggests a temporal 
change in the subject: a past life and a present situation, thereby insinuating Paul’s 
autobiography. But W. G. Kümmel debunked this stance in a landmark exegesis on this 
subject.44 Kümmel’s arguments are anchored on other “autobiographical” assertions of Paul, 
where he says, “as to righteousness under the law, blameless” (Phil 3:6) and “for I was far more 
                                                        
43 In the first millennium of the text’s interpretation, most exegetes (the Latin and 
Greek Fathers) seem to have favored an autobiographical reading of the text—i.e., Paul was 
narrating his personal life story. Later, there was a move to Paul’s pre- and post-conversion 
experiences. But recently, scholars have moved away from such simplistic explanations, 
especially in the light of more insight into Greco-Roman rhetoric. Anthony C. Thiselton, 
Discovering Romans: Content, Interpretation, Reception (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 
157-158. 
44 Robert Jewett, Romans, edited by Eldon Jay Epp (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 
441. 
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zealous for the traditions of my ancestors” (Gal 1:14). Scholars are now dissatisfied with an 
autobiographical explanation on this account. The idea of the egō portraying Paul’s pre- and 
post-conversion experiences has also been jettisoned, for the same reason. 
Instead of an autobiographical reading, current scholarship considers Rom 7:7-25 to be 
a classical instance of a Greco-Roman rhetorical device known as prosōpopoeia: a literary 
device where “the identity of the speaker is conveyed not by … [a] personal name but by the 
speaker’s self-disclosure….” 45 Keck opines that this device is evidently at work in Rom 7. If 
this passage is read as a prosōpopoeia, egō would refer to humanity corporately, and not to 
Paul. Douglas J. Moo aptly captures this: “Nobody in particular and everybody in general.”46 
He calls it the existential direction.47 He lists four directions in interpretation: autobiography, 
Adam, Israel, and existential. He argues that the best reading of egō is the conflation of the 
autobiographical and Israel directions.48 Moo sympathizes with both readings of the egō. He 
reinforces this claim: “We argue for a combination of the autobiographical view with the view 
that identifies egō with Israel. Egō is not Israel, but egō is Paul in solidarity with Israel.”49 
Moo’s reading does not satisfactorily address the concerns of Kümmel; it also does not 
reasonably demonstrate an awareness of the Greco-Roman prosōpopoeia.  
Joseph A. Fitzmyer observes that there are five dominant interpretations for the egō: 
autobiography, psychology, Adam, Christian, and cosmic-historical. 50  These trends partly 
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agree with Moo’s directions. Fitzmyer adds two unique trends, psychological and Christian, 
while Moo speaks of Israel. Fitzmyer argues that the trends in interpretation “trivialize Paul’s 
insight,” because they fail to consider the egō’s encounter with sin and the law from a historical 
and corporate point of view. He says that “Paul views humanity as it was known to him through 
Jewish and Christian eyes, without Christ and in Christ.”51 For Fitzmyer, Rom 7 describes two 
distinct eras in the egō’s journey of faith: before and after Christ. The only concern Fitzmyer 
fails to address is the existential one. His conclusion presupposes that the struggle described in 
Rom 7 is irrelevant to the believer. Frank J. Matera holds that the focus of Rom 7 is the 
(Mosaic) law. The culprit in this narrative is not the law, but sin.52 He accepts but tweaks 
Fitzmyer’s position on the egō: “Paul is not speaking of the present experience of the Christian 
but describing the experience of those who are not in Christ as seen from the perspective of 
one who is in Christ.”53 For Matera, Rom 7 is not a longitudinal reflection, but a latitudinal 
one: it is the Christ-believer’s assessment of those not “in Christ,” not the faith-journey of a 
Christ-believer. Romans 7 describes the situation of an Adamic person living “outside Christ.” 
Michael Gorman echoes Matera’s stance: “Paul is using the ‘I’ to speak representatively as a 
believer about the experience of nonbelievers: either Jews or people in general who are outside 
the Messiah.” The weight of this argument rests on Paul’s insistence on the slavery of the egō 
to sin. The pathetic plight of the egō, Gorman says, is “his [Paul’s] perspective on unredeemed 
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humanity seen through the prism of his redemption in Christ.”54 As exciting as this sounds, it 
makes an audacious, idyllic claim: the one “in Christ” is permanently freed from all Adamic 
tendencies. 
The adherents of the existential reading make an incisive critique of the Adamic-person 
reading: it does not satisfactorily address the internal tension and struggle within the egō, as 
Paul’s words evince: “I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do” (Rom 
7:19). This soliloquy is not referring to the internecine strife of only those “without Christ,” 
but is the story of humanity. Matera’s interpretation also deemphasizes the personal dimension 
of Paul’s claims: it is not a personal struggle for Paul. No doubt, the egō’s conviction about life 
“in Christ” is crucial for any valid interpretation, but to sum up the internal struggle delineated 
by Paul merely as the assessment of those “without Christ” by those “in Christ” is less than 
satisfactory. Matera’s claim implies that those “in Christ,” for Paul, are exonerated from this 
dilemma: they are liberated from the shackles (power and inclination) of an Adamic humanity 
(which is true for the most part).  
Matera further consolidates his claims: “The ‘miserable one’ [that Paul speaks off] … 
is not the Christ-believer but the one who is still in Adam.”55 In this rigid idea of the Christ-
believer, Matera overlooks an unavoidable bewilderment in his reader: Is the Christ-believer 
permanently freed from every proclivity to sin? Matera’s view, I believe, will be strengthened 
if he makes a distinction between the power of (slavery to) sin and the temptation (proclivity) 
to sin. The Adamic self that humanity is liberated from is the dominion of sin, distinct from the 
proclivity to sin. Both traits are characteristic features of the Adamic self. This distinction is 
partly the reason for divergence in opinion on this matter, especially for the existentialist. 
Matera also argues that the egō’s strife is not an incessant one; rather, it becomes history as 
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soon as the individual is reborn in Christ. Commonplace observation shows that the Adamic 
self that Paul describes remains in every individual and can only be checked (not obliterated) 
by the Spirit. Gorman remarks on this nuance: “While believers must struggle not to allow Sin 
to regain mastery … they do so on the assumption of their current liberation from Sin, not their 
slavery to it.”56 This balanced reading of Rom 7 is my stance in this thesis. 
Richard Longenecker observes that the disagreements in interpretations (or directions, 
as Moo calls it) is largely due to the quest to harmonize both pericopes: Rom 7: 7:7-13 and 
7:14-25. He says that there are two distinct uses of egō in both pericopes which is in line with 
Paul’s tenses: the first is an autobiographical reference (Rom 7:7-13); and the second indicates 
the human plight (Rom 7:14-25).57 Longenecker describes Rom 7:14-25 as Paul’s “soliloquy” 
regarding the “tragic plight of people who attempt to live their lives apart from God,” or, better 
still, those who depend on their resources or abilities.58 He asserts that Rom 7:14-25 was 
initially used to address a Gentile audience during one of Paul’s missions. Paul includes this 
material in his letter to the Christ-believers in Rome, because the contexts are similar. 
Longenecker insists that scholars were inclined to harmonize both pericopes, because of the 
similarity in vocabulary. But they ignored the discrepancy in tenses and the disclosure formula, 
oidamen hoti (“we know that”). Albeit Longenecker rightly notes the discrepancy in tenses, his 
conclusion is essentially the resuscitation of an autobiographical reading and a confirmation of 
the Adamic person. Although his approach offers a new insight into reading Rom 7, his 
conclusion leaves the existentialist concerns unresolved. I will now look at Paul’s use of nous 
in Rom 7. 
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In Rom 7:23, 25, Paul speaks of nous as the rational faculty of the Adamic person or 
the egō. He says that there is a “law of the mind” (God’s ordinances known to the human 
intellect) that operates in one’s being, and a “law of sin” that resides in the members. With the 
nous (understanding), one is a slave to the law of God, while with the “flesh” (i.e., bodily 
members under the influence of sin) one is a slave to the law of sin.59 The dichotomies Paul 
identifies are: first, the “law of the mind” and the “law of sin”; second, Adamic person (egō) 
and the members; third, the law of God and the law of sin. These dichotomies evince a 
relationship: first, the “law of the mind” resides in the Adamic person (egō) and seeks out the 
law of God; second, the law of sin resides in the members and engenders the “body of death.” 
From Paul’s dualism, the nous is at loggerheads with sin; it discerns the law of God, and resides 
in the Adamic person. Nous here refers to human reason (of the Adamic person). It is the means 
of assessing and interpreting God’s will. It recognizes the ideal the egō ought to live by, but is 
hindered by the cravings of the “flesh,” the human tendency to disobey God’s precepts. Nous 
comprehends God’s will; it is mindful of the demands of life in the Spirit, but is impeded by 
the Adamic cravings. This usage is congruous with LXX’s. Brendan Byrne concurs with this 
reading. He asserts that nous refers to the human person as a “knowing, reasoning and judging 
being.”60 It is human reason. It is responsible for assessing human choices and processing 
God’s laws. Byrne sees a literary connection between egō (Rom 7:22) and the “law of the nous” 
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(Rom 7:23). For Byrne, the “law of the nous” is synonymous with a person’s internalization of 
the Mosaic law (or God’s will), and its opposition to the person’s subsequent choices. “The 
‘law of my nous’ will therefore be the law of Moses … internalized and accepted as reasonable 
within me.” 61  But Byrne claims that this notion of nous coheres more with Hellenistic 
anthropology than with the Semitic one.62 
Leander E. Keck holds that nous in Rom 7 denotes the affirmations of the egō. The 
“law of the mind,” Keck argues, is equivalent to the “law of God.” He says: “‘The law of my 
mind’ does not refer to some sort of logic that governs cognitive processes but to what the inner 
self affirms, namely, God’s law.”63 Keck insinuates that nous is a faculty of the disputed egō: 
it is not interchangeable with it. Nous differs from the egō. Keck’s task of distinguishing the 
egō and nous is commendable. But his explanation that nous does not refer to human reasoning 
is not successful. The basic meaning of nous here is human reason which aligns it with the 
other uses found in Paul and in the NT. In addition to this, it is the faculty of the Adamic person, 
which gives it a special nuance. 
 
The Nous Christou in 1 Cor 2:16 
After a lengthy discussion on the distinction between divine and human wisdom, Paul 
returns to the issue of division, saying: “But we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor 2:16). This 
affirmation is the crux of the present thesis. For Paul, the nous Christou engenders hē sophia 
tou theou (“the wisdom of God”) and the pneumatikos (“spiritual” person). Christ is both the 
power and wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24); believers in him become partakers of this wisdom 
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when they realize the futility of mundane wisdom and proclaim the wisdom of the cross. When 
believers deemphasize their personal interests (the causes of division) and prioritize their 
collegial call to be united in Christ Jesus, they will live in accordance with the cruciform gospel 
which Paul ardently proclaimed (1 Cor 2:2). The nous Christou enables believers to boast not 
in themselves, but in the Lord Jesus (1 Cor 1:31). But this describes the effects of possessing 
the nous Christou without defining it. I will define the nous Christou as a Spirit-inspired, 
Christ-like mindset that characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body (1 Cor 12:27), the temple 
of God’s Spirit (1 Cor 3:16), and as God’s field and building (1 Cor 3:9). This definition 
coalesces these elements: Spirit, mindset, ekklēsia, ontological quality, and Christ’s concrete 
presence. It is informed by the belief that Paul is using the LXX’s terminology (nous as 
mindset) and imbuing it with a concept of Hellenistic philosophy (nous as the One’s self-
communication). This means that the nous Christou primarily refers to a mindset (LXX), but 
it also signifies the Spirit’s activity in the ekklēsia (Greek philosophy). My claim is not that 
Paul is necessarily relying on Greek philosophy, but that his allusion to the Spirit in the nous 
Christou is analogous to nous of Hellenistic philosophy. But Paul’s nous Christou radically 
differs from the nous of Greek philosophy, because the nous Christou is the mindset of the 
ekklēsia, not just of individuals. However, like in Hellenistic philosophy, the nous Christou is 
an intrinsic quality of the ekklēsia that is perfected when the assembly looks in retrospection at 
the source of its being, the crucified Lord. The nous Christou also makes Christ present in the 
ekklēsia. Emma Wasserman tersely echoes my stance on Paul’s eclectic use of both Hebrew 
and Greek traditions.64 I will now treat separately the already-listed elements of the nous 
Christou.  
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Prima facie, nous here seems identical with the preceding one (1 Cor 1:10), especially 
given Paul’s citation of Isa 40:13, wherein nous means mindset. Here, the LXX uses words 
that suggest a mental activity: counselor, to instruct, to consult, and to teach (in Isa 40:14). The 
dominant verbs in these verses are to instruct and to teach: mental activities. Thus the LXX’s 
translation of the MT’s ruah as nous is mindful of the didactic environment of the word’s 
usage. But Paul interprets nous Kyriou not simply as God’s way of thinking, but as the “source” 
of God’s actions, which is incomprehensible to humans. This principle is not merely an idea, 
but is the means of divine revelation, discernment, and divine probing into everything, 
including the depths of God (1 Cor 2:10). Paul identifies this “source” as God’s Spirit. God’s 
Spirit can discern every divine action (1 Cor 2:11). It makes human beings able to understand 
the divine gifts bestowed upon them (1 Cor 2:12). It confers discernment of divine wisdom on 
its recipients. Indeed, the primary difference between the spiritual ones and their worldly 
counterparts is the possession of God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:14). The Spirit changes the ekklēsia’s 
priority. It determines whether the ekklēsia’s concerns are worldly or spiritual (Spirit-filled); it 
evinces the assembly’s notion of God’s wisdom, either as foolishness or as God’s power to 
save. Since having the nous Christou necessarily implies divine wisdom and being spiritual, it 
is the source of ecclesial transformation. F. C. Godet affirms the agency of the Spirit: “The 
Spirit is the agent … [through] whom this mind of God is communicated to the spiritual man.”65 
I agree with Godet’s point for two reasons: he acknowledges the agency of the Spirit, and he 
speaks of the Spirit’s work as communication (reminiscent of Hellenistic nous). But I believe, 
unlike Godet, that the nous Christou is an ontological quality of the ekklēsia. Believers share 
in this quality by being a part of the ekklēsia (1 Cor 12:27). 
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In Paul’s explication and adaptation of Isa 40:13 in his writings, the original Hebrew 
word ruah resurfaces. His use of this prophetic verse resuscitates the underlying “Spirit of the 
Lord.” God’s Spirit in Second Isaiah is the Lord’s means of intervening in human affairs and 
sustaining creatures. Paul appeals to Second Isaiah, mindful of the Lord’s never-ceasing 
intervention in Israel’s history. But this time, God’s involvement causes the repudiation of the 
“wisdom of this age” and the “rulers of this age”; it inspires the enthronement of divine 
wisdom, and prompts the imposition of God’s Spirit. Paul’s creative and nuanced reading of 
Isaiah plays off his Hebrew interpretative framework. He was conversant with the tradition of 
the Hebrew Scriptures’ interpretation, and appealed to it to reinforce his claims about the 
transforming action of God’s Spirit. This is not to say that nous consistently means “spirit” in 
Paul; but rather, that the nous Christou implies God’s Spirit, given the nuance Paul accords the 
term. Since I have demonstrated that the nous Christou is animated by God’s Spirit, I will now 
explore the other qualities that are seldom mentioned: ontological quality, and Christ’s concrete 
presence. 
Jewett picks up the theme of nous as mindset: “That Paul did not make such a change 
(pneuma for nous) indicates he had something else in mind.”66 He insists that the “mindset” 
element must never be dismissed because Paul intended that meaning. Jewett describes the 
nous Christou as a constellation of beliefs and attitudes (mindset) that the Christian imbibes by 
being placed in the sphere of Christ’s rule by God’s Spirit.67 Jewett’s description retains three 
of the elements I listed above: Spirit, mindset, and ekklēsia. But it leaves out the intrinsic nature 
of the nous Christou and the concrete presence of Christ it elicits. Like all other phrases used 
for the ekklēsia, the nous Christou is characteristic of the assembly. It reveals the ekklēsia’s 
identity as a part of the metaphorical edifice of God. A list of Paul’s notable analogies verifies 
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this: hēmeis … echomen (we have, 1 Cor 2:16), este (you are, 1 Cor 3:9), este kai … en humin 
(you are and … in you, 1 Cor 3:16), and humeis … este (you are, 1 Cor 12:27). Paul’s consistent 
use of the plural verb indicates this. The ekklēsia’s identity as God’s field and building, the 
temple of the Spirit, and the body of Christ is an unalterable quality. It is a static component of 
being an ekklēsia in the “name of the Lord.” However, individual members of this ekklēsia 
occasionally lose sight of this. Thus Paul’s constantly reminds the errant and straying members. 
The other quality of the nous Christou that is rarely spoken of is Christ’s presence. 
Paul’s rhetoric in 1 Cor 1 implies that the perpetrators of division in the ekklēsia have been 
alienated from Christ crucified. Division in the ekklēsia is tantamount to division in Christ (1 
Cor 1:3). The Spirit does not inculcate the nous Christou just to change the assembly’s 
worldview, but to make them Christ-like, thereby making Christ concretely present in the 
ekklēsia. This function of spirits is found in 1 Cor 5:3. Paul believes that the human spirit is 
comparable to the divine Spirit (1 Cor 2:11). So, if Paul can speak about his presence through 
his spirit, God’s Spirit too can make Christ present in the ekklēsia. If the nous Christou is 
inspired by the Spirit, it means that the mindset it imparts configures the ekklēsia into the imago 
Christou. This explains the source of Paul’s authority over the Corinthians: “And I think too 
that I have the Spirit of God” (1 Cor 7:40). God’s Spirit makes acting in accordance to the mind 
of Christ possible. Next, I will review scholarly contributions on this subject.  
Richard H. Bell argues that the “mind of Christ” refers to an “organ of thought.”68 He 
disagrees with readings that render the phrase as spirit or mindset. He argues that God’s mind 
is like an organ of thought for divine activity. He also claims that God’s mind in the OT is 
identical with the divine heart, which is the core of divine personality. Thus he says that “organ 
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of thought” preserves Paul’s intention in this verse, which is participation and not imitation 
(for those who allude to Phil 2:6-11).69 I absolutely agree with Bell’s last point: Paul’s claim 
was that of participation and not imitation, if it is rightly understood (as a Spirit-inspired of the 
ekklēsia). But Bell does not clearly state how this participation takes place. In my opinion, 
participation in Christ is through the ekklēsia, not just through individuals. I also disagree with 
Bell’s OT interpretation of nous as an organ of thought. While Bell is right in saying that the 
LXX’s nous is rooted in the Hebrew lev, he misses the nuances of lev in the OT. In chapter 
one, I argued that the LXX only translates lev as nous if at least one out of three conditions are 
met: first, when the context suggests a mental activity, like understanding or thought; second, 
when heart is used figuratively; and third, whenever a verb that denotes a mental activity is 
employed. So in the LXX’s use of nous, the physical denotation of lev had already been 
expunged. Bell’s claim that nous is an “organ” of thought is not convincing, at least not from 
the standpoint of the LXX’s usage. Whenever a “physical” organ is intended by the Hebrew 
text, the LXX uses kardia, not nous. But if Bell’s “organ” is nuanced to mean a “source” for 
action that is inspired and animated by the Spirit, it would be in accord with Paul’s claims in 
this verse. 
Anthony C. Thiselton argues that the nous Christou recalls the Hebrew word ruah. He 
admits that nous means mindset, and not merely an “organ of thinking,” as Bell argues. This 
mindset, Thiselton says, is elucidated in Phil 2:6-11. He maintains that the nous Christou must 
not be confused with the Spirit, adding that Paul makes a distinction between the two in 1 Cor 
14:14.70 I agree with Thiselton’s arguments that the nous Christou refers to a mindset informed 
by Christ’s Spirit, and that Paul’s quote from Isa 40:13 retains the idea of “spirit.” But I disagree 
with Thiselton’s approach for three reasons: first, he presumes that nous has a monolithic 
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meaning in Paul; second, he makes no effort to explain the transition from ruah (spirit) to nous 
(mindset); and third, he does not distinguish the human spirit from the divine Spirit.71 Surely, 
readers will be interested in the grounds for his transition from ruah to nous, and then pneuma. 
Regarding the first, Thiselton’s basis for dismissing any interpretation that considers the nous 
Christou to be Christ’s Spirit is not persuasive. The passage he cites does not use nous as 
mindset (1 Cor 14:14). The idea of nous here is the human mind unaided by the Spirit’s gift: 
interpretation of tongues. This usage is distinct, although related, to mindset. But Thiselton 
does not notice this. The context is that of speaking in tongues. Paul argues in favor of 
translating what is spoken in tongues in order to build up the ekklēsia. Paul says that at prayer, 
if the spirit prays but the nous does not, the ekklēsia is not edified. But if the gift of 
interpretation (by implication) is exercised after speaking in tongues, the ekklēsia is edified. So 
nous evidently functions as human reason enlightened by the Spirit’s gift. This passage presents 
a different notion of nous (human mind) and does not constitute a solid ground for dismissing 
readings in favor of God’s Spirit. 
Second, Thiselton correctly observes that Paul was relying on Isa 40:13, wherein nous 
Kyriou (the Lord’s mind) occurs. But he does not attempt to establish the nuances between the 
LXX’s usage and that of Paul. The LXX translates ruah as nous, because the context suggests 
thought. This has been discussed at length in chapter one. Thiselton rightly hints that Paul’s 
nous resuscitates YHWH’s ruah. The third weakness in his arguments is the blurred distinction 
between the human spirit (1 Cor 14:14) and God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:16; 3:16). The nous Christou 
does not refer to the human spirit, but to God’s Spirit. This blurred premise is the ground for 
his conclusion that since nous and pneuma are distinct, the nous Christou cannot be God’s 
Spirit. Now if we maintain a clear distinction between nous as a contrary for the human spirit 
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(1 Cor 14:14) and the nous Christou as the embodiment of God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:16), his 
argument will be non sequitur. However, Thiselton’s phrasing of the problem is remarkably 
accurate: a Spirit-informed, Christ-like mindset. To this I will add: it also an ontological feature 
that characterizes the ekklēsia (not just individuals). 
Gordon D. Fee opines that the nous Christou denotes Christ’s mindset as proclaimed 
by Paul’s gospel of the crucified Lord. He says that this idea of Christ is firmly anchored in his 
crucifixion. Identifying with the crucified Lord is the means to communal transformation. For 
Fee, this is the true meaning of being “spiritual.” He writes: “‘Being spiritual’ does not lead to 
elitism; it leads to a deeper understanding of God’s profound mystery—redemption through a 
crucified Messiah.”72 Fee admits too that this teaching of Paul has been widely misunderstood 
by many Christian sects. He claims that the belief that being “spiritual” makes one a religious 
elite is false and grossly misleading. I partially concede to Fee’s point on the nous Christou: as 
a Christ-like mindset. But he overlooks the source of this mindset and the one it primarily 
belongs to. The “source” of the nous Christou is the Spirit, and it primarily belongs to the 
ekklēsia, as its ontological characteristic. 
George H. van Kooten argues that Paul and Philo both share a common Greek 
anthropology—nous-psyche-sōma—albeit with some adaptations: pneuma.73 He says that one 
of the distinctive features of Paul and Philo’s anthropology is the emphasis on “the identical, 
pneumatic nature of God and man in a far more egalitarian and accessible way.”74 This means 
that in Paul and Philo, nous is not solely the privilege of the elite, but is generously offered to 
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being: mind (nous), soul (psychē), and body (sōma). Both consider nous or spirit to be the 
highest part of the human being. 
74 George H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, 
Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early 
Christianity WUNT 232, edited by Jörg Frey (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 311. 
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everyone. Van Kooten implies that nous is the individual’s means of participating in divine 
life. He also claims that nous and pneuma are not synonymous in Paul. Citing 1 Cor 14:14, he 
says that nous is contrasted with pneuma. Van Kooten’s work presumes a rigid, operative 
anthropological framework in Paul. He assumes that Paul’s use of nous is the same throughout 
his letters. He insinuates that Paul’s nous is identical to that of Philo, and to Neoplatonism by 
extension. I disagree with these last three presuppositions of van Kooten. First, we have already 
seen that Paul’s use of nous is fluid: it can mean mindset or understanding. The evidence in the 
undisputed letters of Paul does not give us the grounds to speak of a monolithic anthropology 
of Paul. Rather, his terms need to be understood and interpreted in their rhetorical and literary 
contexts. Regarding Paul’s similarity to Philo, the account in Gen 2:7, which was discussed in 
chapter one can hardly substantiate this claim. In his exegesis, Philo argues that the life-giving 
breath Adam received at creation was nous. There is no evidence in Paul (and indeed in the 
NT) for such an interpretation of nous. Paul holds that God’s Spirit is the principle of animation 
in the ekklēsia, not the nous (1 Cor 3:16). Van Kooten also presumes that the nous Christou 
primarily refers to the individual members of the ekklēsia. This presumption goes against 
Paul’s arguments: “You are God’s building and field” (1 Cor 3:9); “You are the Spirit’s temple” 
(1 Cor 3:16); and “You are the body of Christ” (1 Cor 12:27). Paul’s reference is always in the 
plural. His concern is the ekklēsia. But the members are individually parts of the ekklēsia (1 
Cor 12:27). So van Kooten’s argument that nous is the part of the human being that receives 
divine life is not Pauline. But van Kooten’s analysis of nous is comparable to the Spirit’s role 
in the ekklēsia. In Paul, the Spirit is the divine element in the ekklēsia. It is the ekklēsia’s point 
of contact with the divine: the Lord. 
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Martine Oldhoff, in contrast to van Kooten, opines that Paul cannot be “locked in either 
a ‘Jewish’ or ‘Greek’ box.”75 Paul, Oldhoff says, employs the prevalent anthropologies of his 
time to proclaim the gospel of Christ. Paul’s anthropology is eclectic and cannot be identified 
with any specific ideology. Rather, Oldhoff insists, “Paul qualifies this [that is, the Pauline] 
anthropology by emphasizing mindfulness through God’s Spirit.”76 God’s Spirit, for Oldhoff, 
is distinct from the impersonal substance in Philo’s exegesis. In addition, Oldhoff, to resolve 
the Jewish-Greek anthropological controversy, argues that nous receives the Spirit. Rather than 
postulate a new anthropology, she claims that Paul adapted his teaching on God’s Spirit into 
an already-existing conceptual framework that his audience would recognize. She insists that 
both (the Greek and Paul’s) anthropological frameworks are distinct. Paul’s use of nous in both 
1 Cor 2:16 and 14:13-19, Oldhoff affirms, are consistent. The Spirit fits into this already-
existent framework by residing in the nous (that is, the human mind). Oldhoff’s explanation 
makes Paul’s “renewal of the mind” intelligible. But she fails to distinguish the various nuances 
Paul gives to nous. The two passages Oldhoff cites above, for instance, have two distinct 
senses—mindset and human reason. She also falls into the very temptation she wanted to avoid: 
putting Paul’s terms into a conceptual pigeonhole. In 1 Cor 3:16, Paul unambiguously says that 
naos theou este (you are the temple of God) and that to pneuma tou theou oikei en humin (the 
God’s Spirit lives in you). The first part of the quote identifies the ekklēsia as “God’s temple,” 
while the second part unequivocally states that God’s Spirit resides (has made a home) in the 
ekklēsia. The images used (temple and home) suggest stability and concreteness. In both cases, 
the ekklēsia is called the abode of God’s Spirit, not the individuals, and certainly, not the nous. 
Oldhoff’s attempt to systematize Paul’s nous is impressive, but unsuccessful. Oldhoff falls prey 
                                                        
75 The “Jewish box” that Martine Oldhoff is referring to is pneuma-psyche-sōma, 
while the “Greek box” is nous-psyche-sōma. Oldhoff, “Pauline Mindfulness? Paul’s 
Interaction with Trichotomic Anthropology” NTT 70, 3 (2016): 196, 211. 
76 Oldhoff, “Pauline Mindfulness,” 211. The italics is not mine. 
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to this, because of her selective consideration of Paul’s nous and her disregard for other 
occurrences of the term. But she is right in emphasizing “mindfulness through God’s Spirit.” 
This is my argument in this thesis. 
Carl S. Sweatman elegantly ties together the elements I am arguing for. He delineates 
the nous Christou using apt terminologies: “cruciform” (Christ-like), “mind and mode of 
discernment” and “new epistemology” (mindset), “revealed by the Spirit” and “given and 
maintained by the Spirit” (Spirit-inspired), “new and distinctive framework” (ontological 
character), and “believers” and “individually and corporately” (ekklēsia).77 Although the thrust 
of his article was not on Paul’s Hellenistic influence, Sweatman arrives at a valid interpretation 
of the nous Christou by considering Paul’s rhetorical use of the concept. He provisionally 
describes the nous Christou as the “new epistemology [that] defines appropriate behaviors and 
equips believers with the ability to recognize or discern when the boundaries of appropriateness 
are either confused or transgressed—not just individually but corporately.”78 I absolutely agree 
with Sweatman’s reading of the nous Christou, especially his broad-minded understanding of 
the idea as a principle that foregrounds Paul’s other arguments. In summary, nous in Paul’s 
writings has two basic meanings: mindset and human reason. There are two exceptions to this 
pattern: in Rom 7:23, 25, nous denotes human reason as a faculty of the Adamic person; while 
in 1 Cor 2:16, it means a Spirit-inspired, communal mindset that characterizes the ekklēsia as 
a visible Christ. As such, the nous Christou is a sort of an ontological quality of the assembly 
which individuals in the ekklēsia participate in. Paul’s usage imbues the LXX’s terminology 
with an analogous Greek concept. When coalesced, the nous Christou becomes a Christ-like 
mindset (LXX) that characterizes the ekklēsia (as its ontological feature), which is animated 
and inspired by the Spirit (Hellenistic), and makes Christ concretely present in the community. 
                                                        
77 Carl S. Sweatman, “The Spirit and the Communal Mind of Christ: Looking Again 
at 1 Corinthians 2:16,” SCJ 18 (Fall, 2015): 238-239. 
78 Ibid., 238. 
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Scholars miss this reading because of these presuppositions: first, they presume that the Pauline 
letters have a monolithic notion of nous; second, they are unable to determine the context for 
Paul’s contrasting of nous and pneuma in 1 Cor 14:14; third, they do not strive to ascertain, or 
completely ignore, the influence of the LXX’s nous on Paul; fourth, they are disinterested in 
carrying out a survey of nous in Paul (thirteen instances unattended to); fifth, they cannot 
reconcile the influences of the LXX and Greek philosophy Paul’s nous Christou; and lastly, 
they cannot harmonize the Spirit’s role in the nous Christou as its animating force with mindset. 
I will now investigate the use of nous in the disputed letters of Paul. 
 
Nous in the Disputed Letters of Paul 
 Nous features in each of the disputed letters. It is consistently used in the same sense 
throughout the disputed letters: as mindset. Each usage, interestingly, evokes Paul’s address to 
the Gentiles in Rom 1:18-32. Nous denotes a perverted mindset that is prone to immorality and 
ungodliness. In some verses, there are remarkable agreements in vocabulary and imagery with 
Paul’s presentation in Rom 1.79 In Eph 4:17, the ekklēsia is discouraged from living like the 
Gentiles. The text reads: “You must no longer live as the Gentiles live, in the futility of their 
minds (nous).” This admonition recalls Paul’s argument against the Gentile in Rom 1:18-32. 
Both texts portray Gentiles (from a Jewish perspective): futility of minds, darkened 
understanding, alienation from divine life, hearts marked by ignorance and hardness, 
licentiousness, greed, and impurity. These vices characterize the Jewish description of 
Gentiles. Both texts contain similar vocabulary: “futility (mataiotēti) of mind” (Eph 4:17), 
“futile (emataiōthesan) in thinking” (Rom 1:21); “darkened (eskotōmenoi) in understanding 
(Eph 4:18), “senseless minds were darkened (eskotisthē)” (Rom 1:21); and “every kind of 
                                                        
79 The observed similarity of vocabulary to Romans 1 is not an implicit argument in 
favor of Paul’s undisputed authorship, but a recognition of the Pauline spirit and “mindset” 
that pervades these writings. 
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impurity (akatharsias)” (Eph 4:19), “hearts to impurity (akatharsian)” (Rom 1:24). This 
indicates that both authors, if not the same person, were influenced by the same Jewish 
perception of the Gentiles, which was a commonplace in the first century CE. 
In Eph 4:17, nous implies mindset. This is evident from the content of the passage and 
the other parallel expressions used by the author: “darkened in thinking (dianoia)” and 
“ignorance and stubbornness of heart (kardia).” “Futility of mind” refers to a mindset that 
alienates the individual from God’s life; it is a choice to degrade oneself by indulging in all 
forms of promiscuity and immorality; it is a return to the former self, which is described as 
“deluded and corrupted” by lusts (Eph 4:22). The other instance of nous in Eph 4:23 retains 
the notion of mindset by encouraging the “renewal of the mind in the Spirit.” If the mind of the 
Ephesians is renewed, they will live righteously and in accordance with their vocation as imago 
Dei (Eph 4:24). The renewed mindset is called the “new human” (Eph 4:24). The new human 
eschews falsehood, deceit, greed, and any vice that threatens the ekklēsia. The new human puts 
aside dissension, anger, rancor, and slander. Having the right mindset, or living like the new 
human, also facilitates the building up of the body of Christ, which is a recurrent theme for this 
author (Eph 4:12, 29).  
In Col 2:18, the author urges the Colossians to be on their guard against those with a 
“fleshy” (worldly) mindset: those who brandish philosophy, deception, and human tradition 
(Col 2:8); those who advocate for dietary laws and the observance of the festive calendar (Col 
2:16); and those who insist on self-abasement, the worship of angels, and visions (Col 2:17). 
The author regards these concerns as peripheral and not as the core of the ekklēsia’s faith in 
Christ. He argues that being reborn in Christ through baptism (Col 2:12) means that the believer 
has been “spiritually circumcised,” and that the “foreskin” of the flesh (the old mindset) is cut 
off so as to put on Christ. “The mind (nous) of flesh,” in this verse, alludes to a way of thinking 
that prioritizes superficial practices and human traditions to the detriment of the ekklēsia’s faith 
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in Christ. The NRSV understands this phrase accordingly when it translates it as: “a human 
way of thinking.” The reference to some members’ preoccupation with dietary laws, festive 
days in the Jewish calendar, and self-abasement (or fasting) evokes a similar theme found in 
Romans. Paul uses nous in the context of asking the Romans to adjudicate rightly. But unlike 
Colossians, Rom 14:5 employs nous as human reasoning, not as a mindset (although both seem 
related). However, the same issues are addressed in Rom 14:5-6: Jewish festive days and 
fasting. Perhaps nous is deferred to in peripheral matters, because Paul and the author of the 
Colossians believe that human judgment should be applied to non-integral matters. This also 
means that these sacred writers are confident in the ekklēsia’s ability to make the right choice, 
if they use their nous rightly. 
In 1 Tim 6:5, nous also means mindset. The text reads: “And wrangling among those 
who are depraved in mind (nous) and bereft of the truth….” The context for this quote is the 
admonition of slaves to be loyal to their masters. First Timothy argues that believing slaves 
perform praiseworthy deeds by being faithful to their masters. It suggests that stirring up revolt 
against slave owners, or refusing to be submissive to them, is contrary to the “sound words” of 
Christ and the teaching that is in accordance with godliness (1 Tim 6:3). So to be a loyal and 
submissive slave is to be a godly (pious) person. Godliness (eusebeia), or piety, is a key word 
in First Timothy. It is contrasted with arrogance, ignorance, inordinate craving for controversy 
and disputes (1 Tim 6:4). Godliness is also the surest way to maintain the status quo; it assures 
the ekklēsia of peace and order by promoting the respect of established societal stratification. 
First Timothy plays “safe” by urging slaves to be submissive to their masters; the contrary, in 
the Roman Empire of the first century, would have resulted in a bloodbath. A depraved 
mindset, in this letter, refers those who are poised to sow the seed of disunity and civil unrest. 
The depraved mindset is aptly described by the Greek diaparatribai, which means constant 
friction. Those whose ways of thinking are perverted are inclined to cause friction in the smooth 
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ordering of society and to foment chaos and dissension. The right mindset to have, for First 
Timothy, is that which respects civil legislature and political order, and promotes the household 
codes in families. A depraved mindset is also bereft of the truth and lacking in understanding, 
because it is perceived to be self-serving and not society-minded. 
Affirming the polarity of the depraved mind and the truth, 2 Tim 3:8 describes the 
“corrupt mind” as a “counterfeit (or rejected) faith” and as an opposition to the truth. The 
author’s fear appears to be the household commotion—and, possibly, tension—caused by these 
“lovers of themselves,” who have a warped mindset. Second Timothy 3:2-4 describes people 
who subscribe to this mindset as a good-for-nothing bunch. Beneath the concerns of faith, the 
author seems to be worried about the political and social implications of the reckless behavior 
prompted by a corrupt mindset. They are once again called arrogant and conceited people, 
because they have rejected all forms of advice and caution. Hence, the community members 
are urged to keep away from them, since they will surely bring trouble (2 Tim 3:5). These 
troublemakers, those of corrupt mindset, are described as having only the “outward form of 
godliness.” Perhaps the author is cautioning the naïve ones not to be deceived by their feigning 
of godliness, or by their sheer pretense. Nous here undoubtedly denotes mindset—a way of 
thinking that is perverted, dangerous and destructive. 
The Letter to Titus reinforces the need to expunge all those responsible for causing 
social unrest from the ekklēsia: obstruction of smooth order and the upsetting of families in 
various households. Titus was charged with the primary responsibility of putting in “order what 
remained to be done” (Titus 1:5). To do this, he had to appoint a credible person as an episkopos 
to “preach with sound doctrine and refute those who contradicted it” (Titus 1:9). Titus suggests 
that the greatest threat to the ekklēsia was disunity and “rebellion” mostly occasioned by “those 
of the circumcision.” The author of Titus is convinced that the surest way to preserve the 
community’s unity is to establish a structure that would guarantee sound doctrine. The ekklēsia 
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here is undoubtedly beyond the stage of primary evangelization. It is now seeking to define its 
identity and preserve its legacy. Sound teaching and an effective hierarchy are crucial traits at 
this stage of ecclesial evolution. It is in this context that the author uses nous to describe the 
corrupt mindset of the rebellious faction. The text reads: “To the pure all things are pure, but 
to the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure. Their very minds (nous) and consciences are 
corrupted” (Titus 1:15). The corrupt mindset, for Titus, involves any worldview that 
jeopardizes the peace and harmony that exists in the ekklēsia. The perverted mindset can be 
described further by looking at the contrary qualities in the episkopos’s prerequisite list: 
blameworthy, immoral, rebellious, arrogant, quick-tempered, drunk, violent, and greedy for 
gain (Titus 1:6-7). For Titus, the episkopos is the antithesis of the corrupt mindset. In terms of 
vocabulary, nous in Titus is different from that of Romans. The verb that describes nous is 
miainō; and, in place of kardia, Titus pairs suneidēsis (conscience) with nous. The context 
shows that Titus is addressing a problem similar to that faced by the other pastoral letters. He 
is grappling with a situation of factions in (and perhaps outside) the church competing for 
supremacy. Titus knows quite well that division and selfish ambitions will ruin the nascent 
ekklēsia. Hence, the detractors are unequivocally condemned and publicly denounced. Their 
malicious intentions are wittily summed up in the phrase: pros pan ergon agathon adokimoi 
(“unfit for any good work”). 
 
Nous in Other NT Books 
Apart from the Pauline letters, nous features only in Luke and in Revelation. In both 
books, nous indicates human understanding or the rational faculty aided and illumined by 
divine revelation. Nous appears in the concluding narrative of Luke, where Jesus appears to the 
eleven disciples and their companions and convinces them that he is risen. He explains the 
meaning of the Paschal mystery to the disciples by appealing to “the law of Moses, the prophets 
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and the psalms.” The same verb used in Luke 24:45 (dianoigō) appears in Luke 24:31, where 
Jesus reveals himself to two disciples at Emmaus: “Then their eyes were opened, and they 
recognized him….” In both contexts, Luke reports an “unveiling” of the understanding of the 
disciples to the person of the risen Christ: in Luke 24:31, dianoigō refers to the “opening” of 
the two disciples’ “eyes” after the breaking of bread; in Luke 24:45, dianoigō delineates the 
“opening” of the understanding of the eleven disciples to the Paschal event.80 Luke skillfully 
uses both appearance stories to enlighten his audience about the significance of the Christ-
event. Luke’s frequent association of Christ’s death with his resurrection buttresses this motif: 
“Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and then enter into his glory?” 
(Luke 24:26): and “Thus it is written that the Christ is to suffer and to rise from the dead on 
the third day” (Luke 24:46). From this rhetoric in his Gospel, it is evident that nous in Luke 
24:45 denotes human understanding or the faculty of reasoning (aided by divine revelation). 
Jesus here unveils the rational faculty of the disciples so that they can comprehend his passion 
and resurrection as it was prophesied in the Hebrew Scriptures. 
In the visions about the beast in Rev 13, the author describes the deification of a Roman 
Emperor (most likely, Nero Caesar).81 He says that all those who refuse to worship the beast 
will be put to death. The author also claims that there cannot be commerce without the mark 
of this beast.82 To trade, everyone needs to be marked on the right hand or forehead (Rev 
13:16). This alludes to the phylacteries ordinarily worn by Jews (Matt 23:5). But in Revelation, 
the author reports the incorporation of the Emperor’s insignia into the religious phylactery 
                                                        
80 The “opening” of the disciples’ “eyes” is a metaphorical term for divine revelation. 
It simply means that Jesus made the Paschal mystery intelligible to the disciples.  
81 Wilfrid J. Harrington believes that the imperial cult referred to here is related to 
Rev 13:18 where 666 (Greek for Nerōn Caesar) or 616 (Hebrew for Nero Caesar) is used. 
He claims that the number is a code for the Emperor. Harrington, Revelation Sacra Pagina 16, 
edited by Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1993), 144. 
82 Ibid., 143. 
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worn by Jews involved in commerce.83 The necessity of the beast’s mark for trade might also 
allude to the currency in use at the time. Most currencies would bear the image of the incumbent 
emperor (Mark 12:17). Regardless of the actual historical circumstance, the author wants his 
audience to realize that his symbolic language needs to be deciphered through a divinely 
inspired nous. The text reads: “This calls for wisdom: let anyone with understanding (nous) 
calculate the number of the beast, for it is the number of a person” (Rev 13:18). Nous here 
points to human reason (illumined by divine revelation). It is the power of discerning the 
cryptic language in a vision. Because he wrote during a time of fierce persecution, the author 
opted for a symbolic form of writing that concealed his message. 
In Rev 17:9, a similar phrase is used to introduce nous: hōde ho nous ho echōn sophian 
(Rev 17:9); compare hōde hē sophia … ho echōn noun (Rev 13:18). Both sentences feature 
four similar words: hōde (here, or in this place), sophia (wisdom), echōn (having), and nous 
(understanding). The adverb hōde draws the audience’s attention to the immediate context and 
buttresses the need to unpack the symbolic language. This appears to be typical of apocalyptic 
literature. The author uses hōde to tell the reader that his writing is encrypted and needs 
decoding. In Matthew, hōde connotes physical proximity: “We have nothing here (hōde) but 
five loaves and two fish” (Matt 14:17); and “there are some standing here (hōde)….” (Matt 
16:28). The author of Revelation opts for literary “proximity.” Deciphering the text is not solely 
a human endeavor, but requires the guidance of divine revelation.84 The author wants his 
readers to know that his graphic tales require divine illumination to make his message humanly 
intelligible. 
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Paul uses nous in two primary senses in the undisputed letters of Paul: mindset and 
reason. The exceptions to this pattern, as noted above, are Rom 7:23, 25 and 1 Cor 2:16. In the 
former, nous refers to the rational faculty of the Adamic person, while in the latter, the nous 
Christou denotes a Spirit-inspired, Christ-like mindset that characterizes the ekklēsia. Scholars 
in their attempt to explain the nous Christou ignored the other occurrences of nous in the 
Pauline letters (thirteen instances). They tend to look only at 1 Cor 14. Consequently, the 
preponderant interpretations overemphasize the distinction between nous and pneuma (thus 
insinuating that the nous Christou is not Spirit-inspired) without trying to understand the 
function of nous in 1 Cor 14. Another fallacy committed by these scholars is the assumption 
that Paul’s nous is monolithic throughout his writings. There is no decent attempt to unearth 
the nuances in Paul’s employment of nous. Rather, exegetes invest their energies in showing 
that nous is distinct from pneuma without looking at the wider context in First Corinthians. 
Another defective approach to the study of 1 Cor 2:16 is the preoccupation with Paul’s 
Hellenistic influence. This orientation misleads many into thinking that the nous Christou 
comes from Greek philosophy, and that it primarily means an individual’s mindset. 
In the disputed Pauline letters, nous frequently denotes mindset. It is noteworthy that 
these writings share much vocabulary and the worldview of the undisputed letters of Paul, 
especially with Romans 1. In these letters, nous delineates dispositions or lifestyles that are at 
variance with the cruciform gospel. In terms of the notion of nous and its shared vocabulary, 
these writings are akin to the authentic letters of Paul. It is striking that nous is a key concept 
in the pastorals, especially in the repudiation of the dissident and intransigent members of the 
ekklēsia. The pastorals consistently employ nous in the context of communal organization, 
societal stratification, and the household codes. Those with a depraved nous cause division in 
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the ekklēsia and endanger the smooth ordering of the society, which the authors believe was 
sanctioned by the Lord. 
In Luke and Revelation, nous means human reason or understanding. In Luke, nous is 
the feature that enables the disciples to comprehend the mystery of Christ’s passion and 
resurrection and to see it as the fulfillment of the prophecies in the Hebrew Scriptures. In 
Revelation, nous is the human faculty required to decipher the heavily encoded apocalyptic 
writing. It empowers the audience of this symbolic literature to transcend the imagery and to 
attain to the true affirmations of the author. Nous, in Revelation, is a fundamental function of 
human beings: rationality guided by divine inspiration. Nous is that innate human ability to 
apply commonsense or some wit to a divinely inspired message packed with imageries and 
arrive at its essential truth. Nous here explicitly refers to human reason; but it implicitly 
presupposes the audience’s guidance by God’s Spirit. In the next chapter, we shall investigate 
Paul’s application of the nous Christou (as a Christ-like disposition that is engraved into the 
ekklēsia by God’s Spirit) to the relevant issues at Corinth.  
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NOUS CHRISTOU: THE SOURCE OF COMMUNAL TRANSFORMATION 
Although the nous Christou occurs only once in First Corinthians, I will argue that it is 
the foundation for all of Paul’s responses to the pertinent issues at Corinth. The presence of the 
nous Christou in the ekklēsia leads to consideration for the weak (1 Cor 8:9); it forestalls 
division in the church (1 Cor 3:11); it makes the ekklēsia other-centered (1 Cor 9:22); it builds 
up the assembly into the Christ’s body (1 Cor 8:1); it suppresses factions (1 Cor 1:10); and it 
upholds the primacy of love (1 Cor 16:14). The nous Christou is the pith of the Pauline ekklēsia; 
it is the moral compass for navigating “grey areas” in Corinthian ethics; it is the determinant 
of what is acceptable and what is not; and, above all, it is the source of communal 
transformation. Before investigating Paul’s application of this concept in his various replies, I 
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will recapitulate my understanding of the nous Christou as established in the preceding chapter. 
It is a Spirit-inspired Christ-like mindset that ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as 
Christ’s body, thereby making him concretely present in the assembly. This definition (the first 
of its kind) has six key features: Christ-like, mindset, Spirit-inspired, ontological character, 
ekklēsia, and concrete presence. Each of these features underlies Paul’s responses to the 
problems in First Corinthians. Before delving into the schema of Paul’s exhortations, I will 
unpack the principal features of the nous Christou. 
The first quality of the nous Christou is “Christ-like.” Being “Christ-like” entails 
manifesting an identity that is ontologically dependent upon and connected to the risen Lord. 
It makes the ekklēsia a recognizable expression of the crucified and risen Lord. Second, the 
nous Christou is a mindset. As a mindset, it is the source for all ethical decision-making and 
moral evaluations. Even though the nous Christou is not interchangeable with the observable 
moral decisions that Paul upholds in his responses, it is nevertheless the ontological base for 
every decision taken regarding the ekklēsia. Third, and most important, the nous Christou is 
inspired and animated by the Spirit. The Spirit is the source of this ontological character in the 
ekklēsia. The Spirit is the agent that reveals divine things and makes the ekklesia Christ-like. 
The Spirit defines and engraves the Christ-like mindset on the ekklēsia. The Spirit is also the 
active and operative principle in the nous Christou. Fourth, the nous Christou is an ontological 
character that inextricably bounds the ekklēsia to Christ. Being an “ontological” character, the 
ekklēsia is always “in possession” of this quality.85 Thus activities pertaining to the ekklēsia 
are necessarily instances for manifesting this quality. So Paul apparently appeals to this implicit 
quality in addressing the reported cases. Fifth, the nous Christou is primarily a quality 
belonging to the ekklēsia, and not just to individuals. This means that Paul’s address regarding 
                                                        
85 “In possession,” however, does not mean that the ekklēsia will always act in 
accordance with this mindset. Rather, it implies that the nous Christou the moral compass for 
assessing the decisions and choices of the ekklēsia. 
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the ekklēsia always presumes this notion. The nous Christou, since it is inextricably linked to 
the ekklēsia’s existence and identity, must underlie every issue pertaining to the assembly. 
Based on this assumption, I will argue that the nous Christou foregrounds all of Paul’s 
responses. Lastly, the nous Christou makes Christ concretely present in the ekklēsia. The nous 
Christou is not just an ontological reality; rather, it is a Spirit-inspired nous with a purpose: to 
make Christ concretely present in the ekklēsia, or put differently, to make the ekklēsia a real 
expression of Christ. This purpose is essential if the ekklēsia is to be truly Christ’s body. I will 
now explain the latent dynamics in Paul’s responses. 
Paul identifies the following areas of concern in Corinth: division, sexual immorality, 
food offered to idols, abuse of the Lord’s Supper, and misunderstanding of spiritual gifts.86 He 
tackles these reported cases in a very predictable manner: he bemoans the incongruity of such 
practices to the ekklēsia’s nature; he explicates the intrinsic aberration of such trends using apt 
analogies; he proffers a fitting model of a Spirit-inspired ekklēsia; and he sternly reprimands 
the culprits. Put tersely, Paul’s formulaic response reads: complaint, explanation, analogy, and 
verdict.87 Paul’s reply structure makes this claim obvious: the nous Christou is the ontological 
trait that empowers his analytical and interpretative framework for evaluating all the issues 
reported to him. The fundamental and salient presupposition that foregrounds Paul’s reasoning 
is, “But we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor 2:16). I will argue that Paul’s stance is not only 
corrective and judgmental, but is pedagogical and hortatory. It encapsulates Paul’s 
recapitulation of the cruciform gospel and the church’s identity as Christ’s body. This analysis 
will also reveal that the nous Christou is not only applicable to the issue of division, but cuts 
                                                        
86 The problems to be studied are not exhaustive, but illustrative. Not every problem 
in First Corinthians will be treated; but those examined will suffice to establish a pattern and 
to make a case for all nous Christou-inspired exhortations. 
87 This structure is not monolithic or linear; it only offers a useful way of analyzing 
Paul’s responses. For my purposes in this chapter, this pattern presents a reliable and easy 
way of recognizing all nous Christou-inspired decisions and judgments.  
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across all other cases handled by Paul. So, in line with my thesis, the nous Christou is the 
Spirit-inspired ontological framework that engenders ecclesial Christification.88 I shall now 
investigate the problem of division and its impact on the ekklēsia’s nous Christou. 
 
Division in First Corinthians 
The overriding problem Paul identifies in First Corinthians is division. The presence of 
division in the ekklēsia belies a Spirit-inspired mindset and thus indicates the absence of the 
nous Christou. Paul introduces the problem of division using the phrase: “What I mean is 
that…” (1 Cor 1:12). Citing the source of the complaint, he says that “Chloe’s people” reported 
the sad incident to him. Paul ironically addresses these unwelcome circumstances: “Has Christ 
been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul” (1 Cor 
1:13)? These questions all have a name in common: Christ. The first question explicitly 
mentions Christ; the second alludes to Christ’s crucifixion; the third evokes the baptism of 
believers into the death and resurrection of Christ. Hence, implicit in Paul’s irony is the 
“spiritual amnesia” of the Corinthians: they have momentarily forgotten the gospel preached 
by Paul, and they have lost sight of the foundation of their faith—Christ crucified. These three 
guiding questions also allude to the linear logic of salvation in Paul’s writings: first, humanity 
was justified by God’s grace made manifest in the crucifixion and death of Christ (Rom 3:21-
25); second, through immersion into the waters of baptism and a symbolic participation in the 
death and resurrection of Christ Jesus, believers are reborn into life in Christ (Rom 6:3-4); 
third, when believers are reborn at baptism, they become a part of Christ’s body through the 
ritual participation in the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor 10:16-17). The described unity is not nominal 
or figurative, but is real and active (1 Cor 10:21-22). Hence, the existence of factions or rivalry 
groups in the ekklēsia, for Paul, is always a manifestation of a three-tier breakdown in ecclesial 
                                                        
88 Ecclesial Christification means the community’s transformation into Christ. 
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salvific consciousness: ignorance of the unifying power of Christ’s body; forgetfulness of 
Christ’s death; oblivion of the merits of rebirth in Christ. 
Margaret M. Mitchell believes that 1 Cor 1:10 delineates political and social division 
within the ekklēsia. She claims that Paul’s exhortations, especially the phrase to auto legein, 
connotes political allies, compatriots, and co-partisans.89 This phrase was employed in “Greek 
literature to describe persons in a state of political or social unity from the classical period 
down well into the Greco-Roman era.”90 Paul’s employment of this same phrase hints at the 
nature of the issue he was battling with: the division was a semblance of the political rivalry 
and social disunity found in the Greco-Roman polity. I will now examine the images evoked 
by the questions separately. The first question becomes more intelligible if it is read against 
the backdrop of a Pauline treatise regarding Christ’s body.91 Paul argues that Christ’s body has 
been splintered into political factions or rival parties. The Greek reads: Memeristai ho 
Christos? Merizō denotes political divisions or groupings of political parties. Expanding this 
image, Raymond F. Collins opines that merizō was widely used in socio-political circles to 
delineate units of varied political persuasions. He claims that the political underpinning of 
merizō is evident in Paul’s allusion to “Christ’s body.” Collins rephrases Paul’s question to 
read: “Is the body of Christ (ekklēsia) splintered into political parties?”92 Paul’s allusion to 
divisions in the ekklēsia is corroborated by his Lord’s Supper exhortation: “When you come 
together as a church (ekklēsia), I hear that there are divisions among you” (1 Cor 11:18). Paul, 
                                                        
89 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical 
Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1991), 68. 
90 Ibid., 70. 
91 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 35. Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians Sacra 
Pagina 7, ed. Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1999), 81; Anthony C. Thiselton, 
The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 118.  
92 Collins, First Corinthians, 81. 
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most likely, was setting the stage for an admonition on the manifest divisions in the ekklēsia—
especially at the Lord’s Supper. 
The ekklēsia, as the body of Christ bearing the nous Christou, should manifest unity. 
Divisions or factions obscure this integral quality of the ekklēsia (the nous Christou). The 
division being addressed is not merely divergence in views, but the existence of factions that 
threaten the church’s witness (and perhaps existence). Christos, in the first question, is thus 
convertible with ekklēsia. Paul is furious because the ekklēsia is not allowing its behavior to be 
guided by a Spirit-inspired mindset (the nous Christou). Apart from this political angle, Paul 
is engaging his readers with another defining trait of the ekklēsia: unity. The statement that 
Paul’s rhetorical question makes is “Christ is not divided.” Paul upbraids the Corinthians for 
forgetting their “oneness” in Christ. This unity in Christ springs from the common justification 
of all through faith in Christ. This “common justification” is symbolically and ritually 
expressed in baptism. So Paul says in Gal 3:28, where he vividly describes the transforming 
effect of baptism: “As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with 
Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male 
or female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.” The unequivocal basis for the ekklēsia’s unity 
is the justification wrought in Christ: dying with Christ in order to rise with him to newness of 
life (Rom 6:4). The divisions present in the ekklēsia is a pathetic sign of an internal disorder, 
or forgetfulness, of the ground for ecclesial unity: the nous Christou. 
Frank J. Matera, commenting on Gal 3:27-28, says that Paul berated all forms of 
segregation in the ekklēsia by identifying racial (Jews and Gentiles), social (slave and free), 
and gender (male and female) prejudices. He notes further that the transition from the plural 
“you are” (este) to the singular “one” (heis) indicates the new creation that emerges from being 
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in (or baptized into) Christ.93 Factions thus indicate unawareness of this new creation in Christ. 
This “oneness” of being in Christ is the implicit solution to the inherent factions in the ekklēsia. 
It is elicited by the Spirit-inspired mindset which makes Christ concretely present in the 
ekklēsia. Paul, in stressing the horror of disunity, lambasts the ekklēsia for condescending to 
political partisanship and setting aside the supreme witness of Christ-believers: one body in 
Christ. This witness is springs from the nous Christou: The Spirit-inspired mindset that 
ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body. 
The second rhetorical question reinforces the absence of the nous Christou. It also 
presumes a basic knowledge of the pith of Pauline Christology: Christ crucified is the power 
and wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:23-24). Paul’s theology revolves around the reality of the Paschal 
event. The ekklēsia, being Christ’s body, bears the marks of the crucified Lord. The nous 
Christou which is the Spirit-inspired nous that is ontologically engraved on the ekklēsia 
supports and sustains this cruciform character. Paul alludes to the crucifixion and resurrection 
of Christ, because they are the foundation of justification for the ekklēsia: Jews and Gentiles. 
By alluding to Christ’s death, Paul lucidly states his case: divisions in the ekklēsia obscure the 
reality of the Christ-event. This phenomenon blurs the Spirit-inspired nous that radiates from 
the ekklēsia. Paul calls the culprits “people of the flesh” and “unspiritual,” because they lacked 
the knowledge of the crucified Lord—God’s wisdom and power (1 Cor 3:1).94 Using the word 
eris (quarrel), Paul connects the rhetorical questions of 1 Cor 1:13 to his negative evaluation 
in 1 Cor 3:3 (few verses after the nous Christou). The “people of the flesh” act out of natural 
                                                        
93 Frank J. Matera, Galatians Sacra Pagina 9, ed. Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville: 
Liturgical, 1992), 142-143. 
94 Paul holds that God’s wisdom has been revealed by the Spirit to the spiritual ones 
(1 Cor 2:10). This wisdom of God, as Paul says elsewhere, is essentially the wisdom that 
springs from Christ crucified (1 Cor 1:24). The reception, or possession, of this Spirit enables 
the spiritual ones to discern the gifts of God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:12). Hence, to be “persons of 
the flesh” is tantamount to being deprived of the knowledge of God’s power and wisdom; it 
denotes ignorance of Christ crucified and God’s righteousness; it indicates unawareness of 
the gifts bestowed by God, which are designed for the building up of the church. 
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inclinations, and not in line with God’s Spirit—the source of the nous Christou. Acting in 
accordance with God’s Spirit is acting inspired by the nous Christou. 
The third rhetorical question underscores the absence of the nous Christou. It evokes 
the theme of baptism: “Were you baptized in the name of Paul?” Baptism is linked to Christ’s 
death as Paul claims: “Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus 
were baptized into his death” (Rom 6:3)?95 The reference to baptism logically follows the 
question on Christ’s death, because baptism is the ritual death to the “old self” and rebirth in 
Christ (Rom 6:6). Through baptism, the Christ-believer enters newness of life with Christ (Rom 
6:4). Paul also asserts that baptism is the cessation of slavery to sin (Rom 6:6). “Slavery to sin” 
is the same as adhering to the ways of “the flesh.” The ways of “the flesh” is opposed to the 
ways of the Spirit who animates and inspires the nous Christou in the ekklēsia. Paul implies 
that the Corinthians’ ignorance of the impact of baptism makes the existence of division 
possible. Paul is incensed at the Corinthians because they disregarded the gospel of Christ 
crucified and the significance of baptism: union with Christ (Rom 6:5). The rebirth emanating 
from being transformed in Christ is jettisoned when believers yield to quarreling, jealousy, and 
division (1 Cor 3:3). The Greek phrase Paul employs for baptism is insightful: eis to onoma… 
(“into the name…”). Paul regards baptism as a process through which the ekklēsia is firmly 
rooted in or enters into Christ.96 
                                                        
95 I am going to cite copiously Paul’s treatise on baptism in Romans, because there is 
no discussion on baptism in First Corinthians. However, an understanding of what Paul says 
about baptism in Romans (if Paul’s thoughts are consistent) makes his allusions in 
Corinthians clearer. Besides, Romans presents Paul’s most matured reflections on various 
theological themes 
96 Michael J. Gorman states that Paul, contrary to some recent scholarly 
interpretations, eschews realized eschatology or triumphalism. He writes: “What keeps Paul 
from going down that road … is his understanding of ‘newness of life’ as an ongoing state of 
being dead to sin … and therefore of sharing in the cross….” Gorman, Apostle of the 
Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 369. 
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N. T. Wright reiterates this point: “Those who are baptized have entered into the 
community of those for whom this [the resurrection and freedom from the Adamic self] was 
true, and can be ‘reckoned’ as true, not by a supreme effort of moral will but by calculating 
what is in fact the case….”97 Through baptism, Wright writes, the ekklēsia is immersed into 
Christ. The phrase “in Christ,” Wright opines, means to belong to the “people of the Messiah” 
or to be the “eschatological people of the covenant God.”98 Little wonder, the verb ebaptisthēte 
(were baptized) is plural in form. Paul pokes at the ekklēsia’s intrinsic identity as Christ’s body, 
and, most important, as having the nous Christou. The presence of divisions is consequently a 
privation of the ekklēsia’s nous Christou. Michael J. Gorman proffers an explanation that links 
Paul’s three rhetorical questions together. He holds that Paul’s description of “baptism into 
Christ” is synonymous with his description of “faith in Christ” and “justification by faith.”99 
Paul’s three rhetorical questions, according to Gorman’s argument, have one idea in view: 
dying (sharing in the crucifixion) and rising to newness of life with Christ (sharing in the 
resurrection). Paul’s disappointment with the Corinthians’ conduct prods at their resuscitation 
of the old (Adamic) self. For Gorman, justification is “an experience of dying and rising.”100 
To indulge in activities characteristic of the old self is to downplay the ekklēsia’s rebirth in 
Christ. Brendan Byrne, explicating Paul’s theology of baptism, says: “Behind the expression 
[‘in Christ’] lies the characteristic Pauline idea of the risen Lord as personally constituting a 
sphere of influence or milieu of salvation ‘into’ which believers are drawn….”101 This sphere 
                                                        
97 N. T. Wright, “Romans and the Theology of Paul,” in Pauline Perspectives: Essays 
on Paul, 1978-2013 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 109. 
98 Ibid., 109. Søren Agersnap also argues that the phrase “in Christ,” like many other 
Pauline terminologies, indicates the believers’ intimate link to Christ. Agersnap, Baptism and 
the New Life: A Study of Romans 6:1-14 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 133. 
99 Gorman, Apostle of the Crucified Lord, 369. 
100 Ibid., 369. 
101 Brendan Byrne, Romans Sacra Pagina 6 (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1996), 190. 
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of influence enables the risen Lord to mystically contain “the messianic community destined 
for salvation” within himself.102  
Byrne insists that it is the ekklēsia that is contained in Christ, not just individuals. Thus 
through baptism, the risen Lord creates a new people of God, who are ipso facto marked by the 
nous Christou. Paul reiterates this point in his question: “Were you baptized in the name of 
Paul?” This mystical “sphere of influence” into which the group is assimilated is comparable 
to the ekklēsia. By “containing” the ekklēsia within himself (using Byrne’s words), Christ, 
through the Spirit, marks it with his nous: the nous Christou. So, through baptism (rebirth in 
Christ), the ekklēsia does not just become Christ’s body, but it is ontologically marked by the 
nous Christou.103 Sang-Won Son asserts that baptism effects a corporate transformation in a 
people’s existence and their solidarity with Christ. He writes: “Being in Christ must be … the 
state resulting from baptism into Christ, that is, the believer’s participation in the death and the 
resurrection of Christ.”104 In addition to this, he says that it induces “solidarity with Christ.”105 
Son argues that “solidarity with Christ” means “putting on Christ.” The ekklēsia’s participation, 
solidarity, and the “putting on” of Christ is comparable to having the nous Christou. In line 
with my earlier-established Pauline response formula, I will now discuss Paul’s analogy and 
solution to the problem of division. 
Paul employs two analogies to tackle divisions in the church: agriculture and building. 
These analogies portray an ekklēsia that has the nous Christou. They also remotely allude to 
the nous Christou, because they are anchored in the idea of the ekklēsia as God’s possession. 
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104 Sang-Won Son, Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology: A Study of Selected 
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By belonging to God, the ekklēsia manifests the power of God’s Spirit to bring about unity 
from diversity. This mindset that suppresses selfish tendencies, fosters unity, and downplays 
divisions flows from the ontological character of the ekklēsia: the nous Christou. Using the 
image of agriculture, Paul describes the role of disciples as that of God’s servants, who 
participate in God’s project. The one who gives increase is the most important actor on the 
stage (1 Cor 3:6). By referring to himself as the one who planted and Apollos as the one who 
watered, Paul insinuates that he founded the ekklēsia at Corinth. He admits too that Apollos 
contributed to the Corinthian church’s growth; thus, he and Apollos have a common purpose. 
The Greek puts it vividly: hen eisin (they are one). Paul emphasizes their unity of purpose by 
criticizing the divisions anchored on special affinities to either of them. Paul foregrounds this 
argument by referring to Apollos and himself as synergoi (“coworkers”). Collins says that work 
is a metaphor for the ministry of evangelization in Paul. Hence, to be a coworker is to share in 
this ministry of evangelization and the formation of communities.106 On the one hand, Paul 
admits his role in founding the church; on the other hand, he commends Apollos for his selfless 
service in ministering to the nascent church. Paul’s use of theou (God’s) prods at the crux of 
the community’s altercation: the Corinthians are not Paulou (Paul’s) or Apollō (Apollo’s), but 
God’s field and building (1 Cor 3:9). Paul restates this when he cautions the ekklēsia against 
boasting about human leaders (1 Cor 3:21). He repeats his conviction of God’s ownership of 
the ekklēsia: “Whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas … all belong to you [the Corinthians], and 
you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God” (1 Cor 3:22). Paul rebukes the tendency to 
attribute the ekklēsia’s growth to human agency. 
Paul continues his depiction of an ekklēsia possessing the nous Christou by using a 
building metaphor. His analysis reiterates his role in founding the church, and Apollos’s role 
in ministering to it in his absence (1 Cor 3:10). Paul’s claims can be concisely stated: first, he 
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founded the church; second, the foundation he laid is Christ Jesus (1 Cor 3:11); third, someone 
seems to have built with fancy words or showy rhetoric; lastly, Paul believes that time 
vindicates the quality and solidity of each builder’s work (1 Cor 3:13-15). He offers his verdict 
on a working model of the ekklēsia: “You are God’s temple and God’s Spirit dwells in you” (1 
Cor 3:16). Paul’s claim makes two bold affirmations: first, the ekklēsia is God’s building; 
second, it is the Spirit’s project. The first part reaffirms Paul’s stance that every missionary 
activity is God’s design and not that of the apostle. The second part exhumes Paul’s statement: 
“We have the mind of Christ.” Deeply embedded in this saying is the Spirit’s role in 
transforming the ekklēsia into Christ’s body. Since Paul’s reference is to the unity of the 
ekklēsia and its identity as a part of Christ’s body, its ontological character—the nous 
Christou—is implied. Next, I shall discuss the case of sexual immorality and how it manifests 
a lack of the nous Christou. 
 
Sexual Immorality in First Corinthians 
In 1 Cor 5:1, Paul rebukes the ekklēsia for condoning sexual immorality (porneia). This 
phenomenon starkly shows the privation of the nous Christou. The text reads: “For a man is 
living with his father’s wife (gunaika tina tou patros echein).”107 The phenomenon described 
in this passage is incest: a man having sexual relations with his stepmother. Paul is enraged by 
the ekklēsia’s arrogance toward the incestuous relationship.108 An earlier Jewish prohibition of 
the sexual immorality is reported in Lev 18:8: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your 
father’s wife; it is the nakedness of your father.” The emphasis of the law is on the humiliation 
                                                        
107 The Greek phrase literally means “one’s father’s wife (or woman)” and is a 
figurative expression for one’s stepmother. 
108 Gordon D. Fee says that the cause of the church’s arrogance is unclear (not explicit 
in the letter): whether the community is tolerant toward the act or spuriously considers it to 
be a manifestation of spiritual freedom. See Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians Revised 
Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 214. 
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of one’s father. Collins notes that this sexual prohibition was also found in the Roman law.109 
Paul says that this sexual aberration is not even found among pagans, an obvious reference to 
a wider legal prohibition of such acts. Paul’s response to the erring ones follows the already-
established pattern: complaint (1 Cor 5:1-2), explanation and analogy (1 Cor 5:6-8), and verdict 
(1 Cor 5:9-13). It reveals a nous Christou-informed decision: a judgment based on the 
ekklēsia’s ontological connection to Christ through the Spirit. Paul stresses the impact of this 
scandal on the ekklēsia. His concern in harboring such scandalous behavior is its effect on the 
ekklēsia’s ultimate witness: “Do you not know that a little yeast leavens the whole batch of 
dough” (1 Cor 5:6). This is also the analogy Paul employs to get around the problem. This 
statement implies that the immoral actions of an individual, if not tamed, can hurt the ekklēsia. 
What is at stake here is the ekklēsia’s nature: the nous Christou. Put succinctly, Paul is 
perturbed that the nous Christou is being enveloped by a scandalous act. Gorman reiterates 
this: “The man’s behavior is a betrayal of his identity in Christ.”110 He goes on to remark that 
removing this man from the “sphere of the Lord Jesus” and handing him over to Satan will 
instigate his conversion. 111  Albeit Gorman does not use nous Christou, the phrases he 
employs—“identity in Christ” and “sphere of the Lord Jesus”—imply the nous Christou. 
“Identity in Christ” and the “sphere of Christ” are both parallel to the ekklēsia and are the locus 
of the nous Christou.  
The apt framework for unearthing Paul’s appeal is his idea of the ekklēsia: the body of 
Christ. This conviction is uppermost in his mind when he says: “Let us celebrate the festival 
[the Passover] … with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth” (1 Cor 5:8). Aiding and 
abetting an incestuous relationship in the ekklēsia indicate insincerity and deceit. They also 
manifest a blatant disregard for the ekklēsia as the locus of the nous Christou. Paul insists that 
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the real danger is not the immoral pagan, but the immoral believer (1 Cor 5:9-11). Immoral 
believers pose a greater threat to the ekklēsia’s identity as the concrete expression of the nous 
Christou. Paul also perceives the ekklēsia’s condoning of this act to be a return to a “fleshy” 
mindset (1 Cor 5:8). He exhorts the ekklēsia to act sincerely and truthfully. This implies that 
the covering up of such licentious acts is both deceitful and malicious, since it lethally infects 
the ekklēsia’s image and identity. Paul’s solution in this situation is expulsion: “Drive out the 
wicked person from among you” (1 Cor 5:13). His verdict addresses two issues: the ekklēsia 
and the individual’s salvation (1 Cor 5:5, 11). The ekklēsia is critically important, because it is 
the locus of the nous Christou; the individual’s salvation is equally important since it is a 
participation in the ekklēsia’s nature.  
Paul chooses pentheō as the fitting comportment of the ekklēsia toward the loathsome 
action. Pentheō is used to describe intense grief for a deceased friend or relative (Mark 16:10), 
or for profound affliction and pain (Matt 5:4, 9:15). In this context, Paul probably intends both 
meanings: grief for the straying intransigent member of the ekklēsia, and wailing for a 
horrendous act perpetrated in Christ’s body.112 Both meanings are corroborated by Paul’s 
sanction—expulsion from the ekklēsia (separation from being “in Christ”), which symbolize 
death and disease. Paul’s verdict on this matter evinces his understanding of the holistic impact 
of this act on the ekklēsia: it extinguishes the church’s torch of “new life” and infects the 
assembly with an appalling mindset. In line with this twofold meaning of pentheō, Paul uses 
the analogy of the Passover meal: Paschal lamb and unleavened bread.  
The Passover meal reenacts the critical events that culminated in Pharaoh’s expulsion 
of the Israelites. Among the various food items served, the Paschal lamb and the unleavened 
                                                        
112 Fitzmyer opines that both readings are possible but that he is more inclined to the 
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bread are the most significant. The roasted lamb reminds the Israelites of God’s protection, 
especially on the night when the firstborn of the Egyptians were slain (Exod 11:5). God’s 
protection is recounted at each festival through the imposition of the lamb’s blood on the 
doorposts and lintel (Exod 12:7). The unleavened bread recalls the haste that characterized 
Israel’s departure from Egypt (Exod 12:33-34).113 Paul, mindful of these Passover images of 
communal protection and haste, employs this analogy in berating the ekklēsia. He considers 
this maleficence to be a threat to the communal protection that the ekklēsia enjoys from being 
“in Christ” and being ontologically marked by the nous Christou.  He recommends the errant 
one’s speedy expulsion from the fold.114 The haste with which the straying member is to be 
expelled is reminiscent of the hasty expulsion of the Israelites by Pharaoh. The urgency of the 
sojourn of the Israelites was characterized by a recommended posture and attire for the meal: 
loins girded (like a sojourner) and standing. Paul’s interpretation of this tradition is slightly 
different. He refers to Christ as the new Paschal lamb and says that the ekklēsia is an 
unleavened bread which must never be leavened by the yeast of malice and evil. Paul’s 
emphasis is on Christ’s sacrifice (his death and resurrection) and on the imminent danger of 
leaving the lewd deed unattended (1 Cor 5:7). For Jews, the Passover elicited God’s care and 
protection over the chosen people and the haste with which they fled from the land of Egypt; 
in Paul’s exegesis, the new Passover is the Christ-event and the unleavened bread is the 
                                                        
113 Paul’s use of leaven is not merely alluding to its function in baking, but to the 
Jewish scrupulosity regarding leaven in households, especially at Passovers. Paul is thus 
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ekklēsia. The ekklēsia is the locus for the Christ-event. This reading of the Passover evokes the 
nous Christou. Since the new Pasch is reenacted in the ekklēsia, all its decisions must always 
bear the marks of the crucified and risen Lord to whom it is inextricably bound. 
The ekklēsia’s arrogance (phusioō) is another source of worry. Elsewhere Paul uses this 
verb to signify being “puffed up” by one’s knowledge, contrasting it with love and the building 
up of the ekklēsia. For instance, Paul says: “Knowledge puffs up (phusioō), but love builds up” 
(1 Cor 8:1). He also writes: “Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or 
arrogant” (1 Cor 13:4). Arrogance in these passages always excludes love and the building up 
of the ekklēsia. When Paul upbraids the ekklēsia for tolerating porneia, his fury is directed at 
the menace that this act poses: it will tear down the ekklēsia’s values and obscure the Christ-
like mindset that enables it to act in love.  
Commenting on the deceit couched in the ekklēsia’s negligence and the menace posed 
by the ekklēsia’s nonchalance, James D. G. Dunn says: “To leave such conduct uncondemned 
invites a general corruption of standards…. One diseased member might well spread disease 
throughout the body; the spiritual health of the community as a whole was at stake….”115 Dunn 
observes that the ekklēsia’s welfare (the nous Christou) was Paul’s principal concern. He also 
alleges that Paul might have overemphasized the church’s shortcoming in covering up the 
recalcitrant member, because a high-profile person was the offender.116 He insists that the 
anonymity of the perpetrator gives credence to this belief. Harboring a scandalous relationship, 
Dunn argues, spiritually infects and hurts Christ’s body. Fee believes that Paul’s actual worry 
is not only the church’s tolerance of the act, but its rationalization of a vile deed: “The problem 
… is not simply a relaxed attitude toward this sin, but whether they also tried to give a 
                                                        
115 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul The Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998), 691. 
116 Ibid., 691. 
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theological basis for it and thereby to condone it.”117 The defense of immoral behavior, Fee 
writes, compromises the identity of the ekklēsia as the temple of the Spirit and a possessor of 
the nous Christou (by implication).118  
The logic of Paul’s presentation further sheds light on how to interpret his arguments. 
Paul gives his reason first and then draws his conclusion: “For (gar) our paschal lamb, Christ, 
has been sacrificed (premise)”; “therefore (hōste), let us celebrate the festival … with the 
unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (conclusion).” Paul’s use of the passive for Christ’s 
death is very insightful: “…Has been sacrificed (etuthē).” This is clearly a divine passive. But 
God is only the agent, and not the beneficiary for whom the lamb was slain. The beneficiary 
for Paul is the ekklēsia, and that is why he refers to it as Christ’s body. Paul also presupposes 
another layer of connection in this analogy: since the celebration of Passover demands both the 
Paschal lamb and the unleavened bread, the living sacrifice pleasing to God requires the 
ekklēsia to be inextricably linked and bound to Christ. This dependence on Christ flows from 
the nous Christou. Longenecker aptly articulates this: “It [nous] is a complete inner change of 
thought, will, and desires that Christians are to allow God by means of the ministry of his Holy 
Spirit to bring about in their lives, resulting in a recognizable external change of actions and 
conduct.”119 His renewal of the nous has four features: the inner self, the Spirit, behavior and 
ekklēsia. But they are inversely stated: the Spirit, ekklēsia, inner self, and behavior.  
Peter Richardson corroborates this reading. He says that Paul’s decision is prompted by 
an understanding of the ekklēsia as “the effective form of the people of God.”120 In Paul’s 
admonition, Richardson finds a harmonization of an old traditional understanding of justice 
                                                        
117 Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 215. 
118 Ibid., 216. 
119 Longenecker, The Epistle to the Romans: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 923. 
120 Peter Richardson, “Judgment in Sexual Matters in 1 Corinthians 6:1-11,” Novum 
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and a new notion of the ekklēsia as a school of saints. Paul’s action was not only directed at 
the misdemeanor, but at the protection of the ekklēsia’s intrinsic trait: the nous Christou. He 
imposes a harsh and dispassionate sanction on the incontinent member, because the ekklēsia is 
the foreshadowing of the eschaton. As such, Richardson holds that in Pauline morality 
“judgment and eschatology go hand in hand.”121 This means that the way an ekklēsia manages 
its problems determines its readiness for the parousia. Following Richardson, the nous Christou 
is also an eschatological quality. The ekklēsia’s disapproval of immorality is also a hallmark 
of its being “citizens of heaven” (Phil 3:20). I will now examine Paul’s verdict on food offered 
to idols. 
 
Food Offered to Idols 
Paul resolution of food offered to idols implies the nous Christou. Schematically, his 
argument reads: problem (1 Cor 8:1), explanation (1 Cor 8:2-11; 10:23-30), analogy (1 Cor 
8:12; 10:16-17), and verdict (1 Cor 8:13; 10:14). The main problem that Paul identifies is being 
puffed up (phusioō) about knowledge (gnōsis)— a privation of the nous Christou. In his treatise 
on sexual immorality, being puffed up is partly the problem: “You are arrogant 
(pephusiōmenoi)” (1 Cor 5:2)! This arrogance is fueled by a subtle form of pervasive liberty (1 
Cor 8:9). Walter Schmithals traces this liberty to a world dominated by Gnosticism.122 For 
Schmithals, this liberty cuts across all the problems: participation in pagan sacrificial rites, 
licentiousness, indiscipline at the Lord’s Supper, and skepticism regarding the resurrection.123 
                                                        
121 Richardson, “Judgment in Sexual Matters,” 57. 
122 The gnōs-stem was used twenty-six times in the undisputed letters of Paul. 
Nineteen of those occurrences appear in Paul’s to the Corinthians: twelve in First Corinthians 
and seven in Second Corinthians. This means that the Corinthian problem was evidently 
intertwined with gnōsis. 
123 Although modern Pauline scholarship vehemently disagrees with Walter 
Schmithals’ claims, I am presenting his views here to offer a multifaceted reading to Paul’s 
response. He also does a great job in providing the social context for Paul’s fears; albeit it is 
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Schmithals also notes that there is a potent danger in wholeheartedly endorsing food offered to 
idols. Although the liberals argue that eating meat sacrificed to cult deities is harmless, the 
danger is that such views can lead to paganism.124 Schmithals observes: “…Sacred meals 
preceded by a sacrifice were widespread … in the New Testament times…. Their original 
meaning is that the individual enters into substantial connection with the cult’s god.”125 The 
rite that accompanies the eating of meat is not spoken of in the report brought to Paul. Yet, as 
Schmithals opines, syncretism was a real threat. The other factor that Schmithals highlights is 
the arrogance of the liberals. They indulge in controversial issues just to prove a point: the 
demeaning of corporeality and the exaltation of the immateriality. Describing the motivation 
of the liberals, Schmithals writes: “It is … typically Gnostic to participate in pagan cultic meals 
from a deliberately ‘Christian’ stance. The demons have indeed been conquered. This needs to 
be demonstrated.”126 The liberals are goaded by the quest of testing boundaries; they want to 
prove that the flesh has been overcome. Their indifference, Schmithals notes, is not only 
directed at food offered to idols, but extends to wild pleasures: watching the gladiators battle 
wild beasts and other lewd pleasures.127 
Derek Newton disagrees with Schmithals’ reading (and I completely agree). He says 
that although there are tendencies in First Corinthians that are comparable to Gnosticism, one 
cannot assume that Paul was addressing the full-blown movement of Gnosticism.128 Newton 
also argues that there is no consistency in Paul’s use of gnōsis, because the term appears first 
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without a definite article (1 Cor 8:1), then with one a bit later (1 Cor 8:7). He insinuates that if 
Paul is referring to full-blown Gnosticism, the term would always be preceded by a definite 
article.129 Albeit I agree with Newton’s critique of Schmithals, my reasons for differing are 
much more. Paul’s use of gnōsis is not a direct reference to Gnosticism, but to the “puffed up” 
(and seemingly knowledgeable) members. There are vestiges of Paul’s repudiation of the 
“puffed up” members in his speech on division and sexual immorality. The “knowledge” that 
Paul condemns here, though different from sophia, essentially refers to a mindset that is self-
centered and self-serving. Paul’s berating of the wise is a critique of decisions not inspired by 
the nous Christou. Those who are “puffed up” disregard the ekklēsia’s welfare by leading the 
vulnerable members astray, thus obscuring its ontological trait. 
Paul’s stance on food offered to idols is also connected to his argument on division. 
This is most evident from his use of building terminology (oikodomei). Regarding division, 
Paul calls the ekklēsia God’s building (1 Cor 3:9); the apostles are builders (1 Cor 3:10-15); 
and the people are the temple where the Spirit dwells (oikei). Pertaining to food offered to idols, 
Paul says that “knowledge puffs up, but love builds up” and that “‘all things are lawful,’ but 
not all things build up.” The link between both passages is the ekklēsia, the abode of the nous 
Christou. Paul’s worry about a divided church is the loss of a common identity—being in 
Christ. Likewise in the case of food offered to idols, his concern is the group’s welfare (1 Cor 
10:28). Paul’s moral compass asks: Does the act affect common life? Does it hurt the ekklēsia’s 
reflection of the nous Christou? Wendell Lee Willis aptly sums up Paul’s concern: “…The 
basic principle for conduct set forth in [1 Cor] 10:24 is drawn from the character of Christian 
love … modeled upon the normative work of Christ … and seen in the life of Paul 
himself….”130 Willis’s conclusion introduces another element into Paul’s consideration: love 
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(agapē). Agapē and oikeō connect Paul’s treatise on food offered to idols to the spiritual gifts. 
These terms prominently feature in Paul’s excursus on the spiritual gifts (1 Cor 12-14). Love 
builds up; hence, it is a crucial factor for the Pauline community. Love is the right disposition 
for understanding the nous Christou’s task in the ekklēsia. It is often contrasted with being 
“puffed up” which is self-seeking and self-serving. 
Raymond F. Collins remarks that Paul flays the “puffed up” members’ insensitivity 
using brother-sister language (adelphos): “The repeated use of kinship language underscores 
the egregiousness of the behavior of those in the know. They sin against the members of their 
own family.”131 This tallies with Paul’s incessant reminder: “Do not seek your own advantage, 
but that of the others” (1 Cor 10:24). Paul’s concern for the neophyte’s faith, the welfare of a 
sibling in Christ, and the building up of the ekklēsia, as the embodiment of the nous Christou 
is central to his admonition. His stance on participating in sacrificial meals is characterized by 
a single goal: consideration for the ekklēsia. Because the church is the locus of the nous 
Christou, Paul believes ekklēsia’s decisions must radiate it. Next, I will treat the abuses at the 
Lord’s Supper. 
 
Abuses at the Lord’s Supper 
Paul’s response formula applies to the exhortation regarding the Lord’s Supper. The 
narrative distinctly features a problem (1 Cor 11:18, 21), an analogy (1 Cor 11:23-26), and a 
solution (1 Cor 11:33). Paul’s explanation cuts across the entire pericope. It prioritizes the 
ekklēsia’s welfare and upholds a mindset that conforms to being “in Christ” and proclaiming 
Christ crucified. Paul’s admonition is anchored in the ekklēsia’s identity as the embodiment of 
the nous Christou. It also acknowledges the overlooking of the ekklēsia’s call to make Christ 
                                                        
131 The “knowledgeable” members are those “puffed up” by their arrogance and 
insensitivity for others in the community. Collins, First Corinthians. 
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concretely present by acting in a way that is inspired by the nous Christou. I shall now discuss 
the problem at Corinth. Paul’s diagnosis of the situation at Corinth reads: “… I hear that there 
are divisions (schismata) among you…. When the time comes to eat, each of you goes ahead 
with your own supper, and one goes hungry and another becomes drunk” (1 Cor 11:18, 21). 
This quote unearths two problems in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper: division and 
insensitivity. The latter begets the former: some persons were only interested in members of 
their clique and disdained (or were indifferent to) the rest of the group. Both factors betray the 
ekklēsia’s role as the embodiment of the nous Christou. Paul’s disappointment is reminiscent 
of his earlier question: Has (the body of) Christ been divided? Albeit the latter uses merizō, 
Paul’s worry is basically the same: the creation of factions threatens ecclesial unity. Merizō has 
a political connotation, while schisma evinces a social stratification. In both cases, Paul’s vision 
of Christ’s body was in jeopardy. Thus Paul’s main critique of the Corinthians is that they have 
allowed factions to split the ekklēsia. In addition to schisma, Paul denounces the existence of 
haireseis (factions) in the ekklēsia.132 
Panayotis Coutsoumpos identifies two parts of the Lord’s Supper in the first century: a 
collective meal and the Eucharistic meal.133 He claims that the abuse of the Lord’s Supper 
pertains to the former: the wealthy ones were having a private, earlier meal with their friends 
(or those of the same social status) before the arrival of the less privileged (poor) members. 
The poor members, when they arrive, are expected to eat in the courtyard. Dunn strikes the 
same cord. He says that the Lord’s Supper in First Corinthians shares much in common with 
the Greco-Roman dinner: there is a “first table” and a “second table.” The latter was served 
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alongside a “symposium” (a drinking party).134 The symposium is most likely responsible for 
the drunkenness. Such Greco-Roman dinners feature people from the same or commensurate 
social class. Gorman postulates an identical scenario: “… The poorer latecomers are forced to 
eat separately from the wealthier members … and to scrounge for leftovers.” 135  Paul 
rhetorically alludes to this: “Do you not have homes to eat and drink in” (1 Cor 11:22)? The 
abuses thus are due to the social stratification of the ekklēsia and the lack of concern for the 
economically impoverished ones. Collins adduces reasons for the stratification of the ekklēsia: 
“…The Christian community was not socially homogeneous. It consisted of men and women, 
slaves and free, Jews and Gentiles, rich and poor.” This motley of some parts of the ekklēsia 
incited the division at Corinth. This shows that the ekklēsia was stratified along many lines: 
gender, social, ethnic, and economic. Divisions in the ekklēsia evince a lack of the nous 
Christou. The ekklēsia, as the embodiment of the nous Christou, must eradicate every form of 
division, and celebrate the Lord’s Supper as one. 
Although scholars agree that the Greco-Roman dinner is (in whole or part) parallel to 
that of the Lord’s Supper, there are noticeable areas of divergence. For instance, Dunn says 
that Paul intended a single meal, and not several courses. He writes: “The practice, he [Paul] 
rebukes, is not that of a meal separate from the Lord’s Supper, but the abuse of a single meal 
… which began with the one bread and ended with the cup….”136 Dunn’s remark is based on 
Paul’s analogy of the one bread and the one cup (1 Cor 11:23-26). His explanation favors a 
single meal, which is large enough to make its participants full and drunk. The problem with 
this reading is that it presumes Paul was describing a practice. But Paul was only using a 
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formula that is equally found in the Synoptic Gospels.137 Paul’s leitmotif was to emphasize the 
theological significance of the celebration: commemorative participation in the Lord’s death 
(1 Cor 11:26). Thus, Paul’s analogy is not a sufficient ground to speak of a single meal, because 
he was only concerned about the particular meal abused: the Lord’s Supper. 
The Gospel of Luke hints at multiple meals: a cup was offered first, thereafter a loaf of 
bread was accompanied by another cup (Luke 22:17, 19-20). Luke’s presentation of the Last 
Supper differs from the other Synoptic Gospels and is probably in agreement with the Greco-
Roman tradition. Luke Timothy Johnson opines that Luke’s account of the Lord’s Supper is 
closer to secular practice. He says that the variety found in the other Synoptic Gospels might 
have been attempts by scribes to edit the account in Luke: “The shorter versions [of the blessing 
over the cup] … testify by their variety to the attempts by scribes to ‘correct’ Luke, either by 
eliminating the first blessing over the cup or the second, or inverting the order so that the 
sequence better matches that of Mark and Matthew.”138 Despite the diversity in the number of 
meals shared, there is a remarkable agreement on the significance Paul imputes into (or derives 
from) the Lord’s Supper. This significance envelops the nous Christou’s relevance to Paul’s 
exhortation. 
Gorman spotlights three items: solidarity (koinōnia), remembrance (anamnesis), and 
proclamation.139 These elements that delineate the Lord’s Supper indicate the nous Christou: 
the ontological mark of the ekklēsia. Paul explicitly mentions two of Gorman’s points: 
anamnēsis (remembrance) and kataggeleō (to proclaim). Both appear in the Synoptic Gospels. 
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Paul implies the other factors—koinōnia and eulogeō (to bless)—in his explanation. In 1 Cor 
11:26, he defends the celebration’s symbol of solidarity and remembrance: “For as often as 
you (plural) eat this bread (singular) and drink the cup (singular), you (plural) proclaim the 
Lord’s death until he comes.” The Lord’s Supper symbolically effects unity in the ekklēsia. 
Gorman aptly expresses this unity: “Paul believes the ‘real presence’ of Jesus in this meal is in 
the members of his body; Christ and church (=people) are inseparable for him.”140 Gorman 
hints at the nous Christou in several ways: first, he speaks of Christ’s real presence in the 
ekklēsia; second, he says that Christ and ekklēsia are inseparably bound. Paul foregrounds the 
role of anamnesis in the Lord’s Supper. Recalling is not just thinking, but also a communal 
participation in proclaiming the Lord’s death in anticipation of the coming glory. Gorman 
beautifully recapitulates this: “It [remembrance] meant faithfully responding to God and God’s 
past saving actions, which are made present and effective once again in the act of faithful 
remembrance.”141  Hence, a befitting celebration of the Lord’s Supper must showcase the 
ekklēsia as being ontologically marked by the nous Christou. 
 
Spiritual Gifts 
Paul marks the introduction of his treatise on spiritual gifts with the phrase peri de tōn 
pneumatikōn (“but concerning spiritual things”). Tōn pneumatikōn is used substantively. It can 
denote a host of spiritual realities: persons, things, and gifts. But in this context, it refers to the 
phanerōsis tou pneumatos (“manifestation of the Spirit”). This “manifestation” of the Spirit is 
meant for the building up of the ekklēsia and not for self-aggrandizement. However, a case can 
be made for alternative readings like “spiritual persons” and “spiritually-gifted persons,” since 
Paul wanted to dispel the ignorance of such persons in the ekklēsia: ou thelō humas agnoein 
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(“I do not want you to be uninformed”).142 Paul’s allusion to the pagan background of these 
persons shows that the confusion regarding these “manifestations of the Spirit” was due to the 
extant pagan allegiance of these converts. Paul says: “Therefore, I reveal (gnōrizō) to you that 
no one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ unless (he/she is inspired) by the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor 12:3—au. 
trans.). Paul concludes with dio which ushers in an adverbial clause of reason.  
Paul’s remark can be simplified further: no one can witness to Christ unless inspired by 
the Holy Spirit. Two things emerge from Paul’s synopsis: first, the manifestations of the Spirit 
are invitations to witness to Christ; second, the Spirit inspires all genuine acts of witnessing. 
Paul’s claims evoke the nous Christou: the Spirit and Christ’s concrete presence in the ekklēsia. 
Paul’s employment of gnōrizō (to reveal) in describing his project is insightful. In the NT, 
gnōrizō is used in revelatory contexts. In Acts 7:13, Joseph discloses (gnōrizō) his identity to 
his brothers who previously knew him by a different name and in a different capacity. In Rom 
16:26, the mystery of salvation that had been kept secret for many ages is revealed (gnōrizō). 
Both passages presume the following: first, the things revealed were disguised in the past; 
second, revelation is the unveiling of things obscured in the past. In both cases, newness refers 
to the subject’s perception and not to the object. If we transpose this understanding of gnōrizō 
to Paul’s treatise on the spiritual gifts, the following is deduced: first, Paul was not identifying 
more spiritual gifts (object); second, Paul was unveiling the right notion of spiritual gifts that 
the Corinthians were already acquainted with (subject). Paul’s summary of the fundamental 
issues pertaining to the spiritual gifts paves the way for its investigation. His treatise presumes 
the nous Christou with a special focus on Spirit-inspired and ekklēsia. Paul’s overriding 
principle is that the spiritual gifts are given for the building up of the ekklēsia. He uses the 
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metaphor of the human body to clarify this. I will now examine Paul’s explanation on the 
meaning and purpose of the spiritual gifts. 
The operative word in Paul’s elucidation on spiritual gifts is diairesis (“variety”).143 
This term derives from the same root as another word that Paul criticized in his earlier response 
on the abuses of the Lord’s Supper: hairesis (“sect”). Both words are homophones. Paul initial 
Greek-speaking audience must have perceived his subtle connection in using like-sounding 
words. Paul implicitly plays on these words: diairesis is the diversity sown into the assembly 
by the Spirit to elicit unity from multiplicity; hairesis is the division orchestrated by “people 
of the flesh” and engenders disunity and acrimony in the ekklēsia. The former makes many 
one, while the latter makes one many. Paul names three things bestowed by the Spirit: 
charismatōn (gifts), diaconiōn (ministries), and energēmatōn (works). These items are not 
specific gifts, but the hermeneutical framework for understanding the spiritual gifts. This 
becomes evident when the root meanings of these words are examined: charisma (grace), 
diakonia (service), and energē (work). Although Paul does not dwell further on these root 
meanings, he presumes that his readers are well acquainted with his stance on them. For 
instance, in Rom 3:24, he describes humanity’s justification in Christ as a charisma (gift), 
because Jews and Gentiles were redeemed not by works of the law or the knowledge of right 
living, but by the redemptive death of Christ. In describing spiritual gifts as service and work, 
Paul wants the ekklēsia to have the right mindset in exercising these gifts: they are meant for 
service and the building up of the ekklēsia, and not for personal aggrandizement or the creation 
of classes or divisions. Collins sums this up: “The exercise of the gifts … is the way in which 
each Christian serves [the] one and the same Lord…. These gifts are the means by which God 
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acts within the community.”144 The recognition of the need to serve while using the gifts is 
deeply rooted in the ekklēsia’s ontological character: the nous Christou. 
After mentioning diairesis three times and listing three spiritual categories (charisma, 
diakonia, and energē), Paul adduces three reasons why this diversity of spiritual gifts fosters 
ecclesial unity: to auto pneuma, ho autos kurios, and ho autos theos (“the same Spirit,” “the 
same Lord,” and “the same God”).145 For Paul, the diversity in the ekklēsia has its origin in 
God: one God, one Lord, and one Spirit (the source of the nous Christou). The unity of divine 
action nurtures a diversity of gifts that serves the furtherance of gospel. Paul’s enumeration of 
these gifts appears complementary: logos sophias (wisdom) and logos gnōseōs (knowledge); 
pistis (faith) and charismata iamatōn (gifts of healing); energēmata dunameōn (mighty works) 
and propheteia (prophecy); diakriseis pneumatōn (discernment of spirits) and genē glōssōn 
(speaking in tongues) and hermēneia glōssōn (interpretation of tongues). The complementary 
nature of these gifts listed alludes to their intended design for the ekklēsia: to elicit 
interdependence and to unify Christ-believers. Paul gives a rhetorical flourish to his 
explanation using the phrase to hen pneuma (“the one Spirit”) and to auto pneuma (“the same 
Spirit”). He thus implies that the Spirit is the bedrock of church unity. This one and the same 
Spirit picks up the theme of the nous Christou. Collins reiterates this: “…The Spirit … [is the] 
unifying and dominant theme.” 146  The Spirit is the animating principle in the ekklēsia, 
especially of the nous Christou; and it is also the source of all ecclesial gifts. Pointedly, division 
is baseless and incongruous with the idea of the ekklēsia, because it is not founded on the one 
and the same Spirit. Oneness implies unity and cohesion. Unity and cohesion are only possible 
because of the ekklēsia’s ontological character: the nous Christou. 
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Another integral phrase in Paul’s description of the Spirit’s authorship of the charisms 
in the ekklēsia is: he phanerōsis tou pneumatos pros to sumpheron (“the manifestation of the 
Spirit for the common good”). This translation retains two crucial aspects of Paul’s treatise on 
the meaning and purpose of the spiritual gifts: first, the gifts are manifestations of the Spirit; 
second, they are given for the building up of the ekklēsia. These points recall the nous Christou: 
Spirit-inspired and ekklēsia. Paul’s choice of the term “manifestation” means that the spiritual 
gifts reveal God’s Spirit. 147  I will now examine Paul’s metaphor of the human body in 
clarifying the operation of the spiritual gifts. Paul likens the presence of the spiritual gifts in 
the ekklēsia to that of the members of the body. He delineates the interdependence of the parts 
of the human body, their compensation for each other’s weaknesses, and solidarity. Paul’s 
metaphor is tendentious: it builds up steadily to his final statement— “You are the body of 
Christ” (1 Cor 12:27). Collins says that the human body was widely used as an image of social 
unity.148 Apart from the commonplace affirmation of this analogy, Collins notes that Paul’s use 
of this widespread metaphor has some peculiar twists: first, Paul attributed the diversity in the 
body to God and not to nature; second, his emphasis was on using the varied gifts for the 
common good; third, he stressed the interdependence of all the members.149 In addition to this, 
Paul also says that the weak parts are indispensable (1 Cor 12:22). The nous Christou 
foregrounds Paul’s nuance: the Spirit (God) and ekklēsia (common good).  
Paul makes another important point: solidarity. The parts of the body are not only 
interdependent, but they support and identify with each other’s experience. Paul, by adding this 
                                                        
147 Paul alludes to this role of spirits in general: “For though absent in body, I am 
present in spirit…” (1 Cor 5:3); and “when you are assembled, and my spirit is present with 
the power of our Lord Jesus” (1 Cor 5:4). Paul evidently speaks of the spirit as the principle 
of making one who is physically absent concretely present. This logic applies Christ as well. 
148 The metaphor of the human body as a model of social unity is widely attested in 
Greco-Roman literature and politics. Paul simply adapts this widespread analogy to 
explicating the functioning of the spiritual gifts. Collins, First Corinthians, 458-459. 
149 Ibid., 460. 
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twist, sets the stage for his discourse on love, the defining characteristic of a Spirit-inspired 
ekklēsia (1 Cor 13:13). Solidarity is a crucial concept for Paul, because it is the pivot of the 
ekklēsia. Paul’s prioritization of the spiritual gifts is not according to any intrinsic value, but 
their impact on the ekklēsia (1 Cor 14:3-5). All gifts are assessed in relation to the building up 
of Christ’s body. Paul’s verdict is: “You are the body of Christ (sōma Christou) and 
individually members of it” (1 Cor 12:27). Paul’s use of the emphatic phrase humeis este (you 
are) alludes to his point at the beginning of the letter: “But we have the mind of Christ.” From 
this exposition of the spiritual gifts, the following can be observed: the diversity of the spiritual 
gifts is meant for ecclesial unity; the gifts help to build up the ekklēsia; the diversity of spiritual 
gifts manifests the Spirit; and the variety of the gifts fosters interdependence. These effects 
spring from the Spirit’s operation in the ekklesia: the nous Christou. The nous Christou is not 
identical to the ekklēsia but is deeply engrained in its nature as Christ’s body. 
 
Summary 
The word that underlies all the issues treated is ekklēsia. Paul’s worry for the ekklēsia 
cannot be overstated. The ekklēsia connects the nous Christou to the incidents tackled by Paul. 
The ekklēsia is the locus where the nous Christou is found and experienced. I have argued here 
that the nous Christou foregrounds Paul’s replies. It is a Spirit-inspired, Christ-like mindset 
that ontologically marks the ekklēsia as Christ’s body. The observable effect of possessing the 
nous Christou is the manifestation of the Lord’s presence in the ekklēsia: this entails a way of 
life and a decision-making process that conforms to the gospel of the crucified Lord. I have 
also delineated the schematics of Paul’s responses: issue, explanation, metaphor, and verdict. 
This scheme is not a fossilized mold; rather, it is a blueprint for a rhetorical reading of Paul’s 
replies. His arguments always presuppose the nous Christou (as an ontological character of the 
ekklēsia). In the case of division, Paul rules on the subject using these statements: “You are 
 97 
God’s field and God’s building,” and “You are the temple of God’s Spirit.” The division in the 
ekklēsia is counteracted by Paul’s metaphor of unity and stability: building. This image reminds 
the ekklēsia that it has been made one in Christ. Thus factions are self-serving and baseless. 
On immorality, Paul mandates the ekklēsia: “Drive out the wicked person from among you!” 
This instruction is founded on the realization that the ekklēsia is Christ’s body, and as such, 
cannot condone immorality. The ekklēsia is one with Christ; it makes Christ visible through its 
unwavering commitment to Christ crucified. Harboring such an immoral person jeopardizes 
the ekklēsia’s identity and witness. It also avails the miscreant the opportunity for conversion. 
Pertaining to food offered to idols, Paul does not condemn the eating of meat, but the 
lack of consideration for the vulnerable ones in the ekklēsia. Sensitivity is Paul’s solution for 
food offered to idols. The nous Christou thus inspires other-centeredness. It also empowers 
recognition of others as brothers and sisters for whom Christ died. Regarding the abuse of the 
Lord’s Supper, Paul writes: “When you come together to eat, wait for one another.” Paul rightly 
perceives the problem: lack of consideration for others. The wealthier members were not 
waiting for the poorer ones. Consideration for others teaches solidarity and unity. Paul’s claim 
on the spiritual gifts is similar. Here, he says: “You are the body of Christ.” Being the body of 
Christ means being united, acting as one, respecting everyone, helping one another, and 
supporting each other. The nous Christou, being an ontological mark that characterizes the 
ekklēsia, is the source of Christ-like living. It underlies Paul’s assessments and judgments 
regarding the ekklēsia; it empowers the ekklēsia to concretely manifest Christ; and it guarantees 
unity and fosters mutual respect and community building. Whenever Paul has the ekklēsia in 






In this work, I set out to prove three theses: first, that Paul’s employment of the phrase 
nous Christou cannot simply and solely be attributed to the influence of Greek philosophy (as 
many exegetes argue); second, that the nous Christou can be defined as a Spirit-inspired, 
Christ-like mindset that ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body; and third, 
that the nous Christou underlies all of Paul’s responses to the issues perturbing the ekklēsia at 
Corinth. Each of these theses was addressed in chapters one, two, and three respectively. In 
chapter one, I surveyed the use of nous in the LXX, Middle Platonism, Philo, Josephus, and 
Neoplatonism. The survey produced the following results: first, the LXX and Josephus used 
nous identically (i.e., mindset and understanding); and second, Middle Platonism, Philo, and 
Neoplatonism used nous in a similar way (i.e., as a Demiurge or divine substance in humans). 
In chapter two, I observed that nous had two basic senses in Paul and in the NT: mindset and 
understanding. These senses are consistently employed except for Rom 7:23, 25 and 1 Cor 
2:16. In Rom 7, nous is given a special nuance—the human understanding (faculty of 
reasoning) of the Adamic person; while in 1 Cor 2:16 nous refers to a Spirit-inspired, Christ-
like mindset that ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body. In chapter three, I 
argued that since Paul’s priority in all his responses was the ekklēsia, the nous Christou as an 
ontological feature of the ekklēsia, underlies these replies. While Paul does not repeat the 
phrase nous Christou, it foregrounds all of Paul’s discussion concerning the assembly. 
Hence, I am making these claims: first, Paul’s use of the nous Christou is influenced 
by multiple traditions (the LXX, Hellenistic philosophy, and his literary ingenuity); second, 
the nous Christou is not simply a mindset or the Spirit, but is a Spirit-inspired, Christ-like 
mindset that ontologically characterizes the ekklēsia as Christ’s body; and third, the nous 
Christou is the source of communal transformation in First Corinthians. This means that the 
hasty and banal attribution of Paul’s employment of nous Christou to Hellenistic philosophy 
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must be jettisoned as unconvincing. Rather, Paul’s terminology (nous) syncs with the LXX, 
while his peculiar nuance (Spirit-inspired) aligns with Greek philosophy. Regarding the 
meaning of nous Christou, it must be clearly stated here that the decision is not an either-or, 
but a both-and. The nous Christou is not merely “the Spirit,” because in 1 Cor 14 Paul 
demonstrates the distinction between nous and pneuma; in the same vein, the concept does not 
simply denote “mindset,” because Paul uses it in the context of discussing the Spirit’s role in 
the ekklēsia. Instead, nous Christou is Paul’s ingenious coalescing of the LXX’s nous and 
Hellenistic philosophy’s nous so as to communicate the Spirit’s unique role in the life of the 
ekklēsia. The nous Christou is also the source of communal transformation, because it is an 
ontological quality of the ekklēsia that characterizes it as Christ’s body. As such, it is always 
implicit in Paul’s responses, because it is the very nature of the ekklēsia. This becomes more 
apparent when the structure of Paul’s responses is critically and carefully examined. 
This synopsis could be extended to the other Pauline letters, because the foundation for 
this assertion is Paul’s consistent idea of the ekklēsia and the ontological nature of the nous 
Christou. In that project, the socio-religious milieu of Paul can be widened to include his 
historico-political milieu as well. In such a broadened academic and literary environment, 
Paul’s nous can be explored against a historical and political backdrop, thereby explicating the 
usage of the concept in other forms of secular literature. Lastly, this thesis is heavily dependent 
on a rhetorical and literary reading of First Corinthians (and the other Pauline letters). 
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